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Diplomityö esittelee valuaatiopohjaisen viitekehyksen, joka auttaa patentteja omistavan 
yrityksen johtoa tunnistamaan patenttilisensoinnin kannalta olennaisimmat liiketoiminnan 
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yrityksen käytössä olevat aktiviteetit ja resurssit lisenssineuvotteluja kuvaavan valuaatiomallin 
korostamiin tekijöihin. Työ tukee yritysten päätöksentekoa sekä yksittäisiin 
lisenssineuvotteluihin valmistautumisessa että liiketoiminnan kehittämisessä 
lisensointifokuksella. 
Diplomityön analyysi on rajattu puhtaaseen patenttilisensointiin, joka lisensoinnin teoreettisena 
perusmuotona auttaa tunnistamaan keskeisiä tekijöitä patenttilisensointia koskien laajemmin. 
Patenttilisenssin hinnan muodostumista kuvataan peliteoreettisella valuaatiomallilla, jonka 
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merkittävyydestä ja patentin omistajan kyvykkyyksistä suhteessa lisenssin ostajaan, patenttien 
ja potentiaalisten lisenssin ostajien valikointi neuvotteluihin nousee keskeiseksi lisensoivan 
yrityksen tehtäväkokonaisuudeksi. Lisäksi litigoinnin merkitys korostuu patenttilisensoinnissa 
lisenssikysyntää ohjaavana tekijänä. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis analyses how patent management as an organisational capability should 
be built to support value appropriation from patents when the patent strategy 
pursued by the firm is focused on licensing. The analysis focuses on key factors 
impacting licensing negotiations and how these link to different patent management 
activities and resources based on interviews with patent management experts. The 
licensing negotiation is theoretically summarised with a game theoretic licensing 
valuation model which, together with key patent management activity domains, 
serve as the framework for analysing value appropriation in the context of a single 
negotiation and as a result of long-term efforts throughout patent management.  
The thesis contributes to the resource-based literature by linking the exchange value 
of a resource to capability features contributing to value appropriation and to patent 
management literature by identifying key patent management activities and 
resources from the specific strategic standpoint of licensing. The thesis also bridges 
some of the gap between economic theory and managerial insight by combining 
game theory with resource-based thinking. For practitioners, the thesis provides a 
valuation-based framework to support decision-making and business development 
in patent licensing.  
1.1. MOTIVATION 
The practical challenge for patent owning firms is how to make the most out of their 
assets. Patents as assets are uncertain recourses that cost to be maintained and have 
only the potential to be valuable to their owner before used. They get granted as a 
result of an imperfect process, which is mitigated by the fact that they can be 
invalidated (Teece 2000), and commercially only a handful of them can be expected 
to return their investment as most of their measured value is focused on few top-
earning ones (Pakes 1986; Scherer and Harhoff 2000).  
On the other hand, a focus on value appropriation from patents can be highly 
lucrative – something which IBM’s jump from $30 million in 1990 to nearly $1 
billion in yearly patent licensing revenue in 2000 (Rivette and Kline 2000) and 
Nokia’s more recent €1.6 billion in patent, brand and technology licensing revenue 
in 2017 (Nokia Corporation 2018) indicate. To help firms in focusing their limited 
resources to key issues instead of squandering them all over, this thesis aims to shed 
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light on what patent owning firms should consider investing in based on target 
outcomes. 
Value appropriation from patents is not automatic (Pisano 2006) and should be 
considered as endogenous to the firms that own them. In practice, patents covering 
significant commercial inventions from an objective standpoint can lead to different 
subjective outcomes based on how and by whom they are used. Some firms may be 
unable to appropriate the potential value from their patents when others may on the 
other hand be able to “skilfully enhance the impact of patent rights through 
coordinated (and typically resource intensive) actions” by their patent management 
(Somaya 2012: 1086).  
Patent owning firms have two general ways to appropriate value from their patents: 
by implementing them in their own products or processes and using them as 
protection against rival businesses, or by licensing them to other players and 
benefiting from their ability to commercialise the patented technologies. The patent 
management of the firm can be built around the strategy the firm decides to pursue. 
How this should be done and what the firms should invest in especially when 
pursuing a licensing-focused strategy, are however not fully answered by extant 
literature. According to Somaya (2012), much of the managerial literature related to 
patent management and generic patent strategies has focused on distinct activities 
such as patenting. What has been missing is attempts to explain how different 
activities should be coordinated based on generic or specific patent strategies. For 
example, although Reitzig and Puranam (2009) study coordination of different types 
of patent-related activities, their focus is on patenting and value appropriation from 
research and development (R&D) – not on value appropriation from patents, which 
patent strategies focus on. In this thesis, patent management activities as a whole 
are analysed from the perspective of a patent owning firm pursuing a leveraging 
strategy specifically focused on licensing.  
On expected terms, value appropriation in the case of patent licensing can be thought 
to occur at the moment firms reach an agreement on the price of a license. The target 
outcome is to maximise the appropriated value – license price in a given deal or 
throughout licensing as the sum of license prices in separate deals. How license 
prices are formed in theory have been studied by economists and their findings can 
be used to pinpoint key issues the patent management of the firm should be built to 
address. In this thesis, a descriptive model of license price formation in a single 
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licensing negotiation is used to help create logical paths from licensing outcomes to 
distinct patent management activities and resources affecting them. As firms can be 
challenged by decisions concerning current licensing prospects as well as 
considering how to build their patent management overall to support a licensing-
focused strategy, this thesis aims to connect the dots from licensing outcomes to 
patent management both in the context of a single negotiation and overall capability 
building.  
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research problem of this thesis is compressed in the following question: 
What activities and resources should a patent owning firm invest 
in to appropriate value from its patents in licensing negotiations? 
The research problem is based on the definition, that patent management as a 
capability consists of organised activities that call upon different types of resources. 
To answer the research problem, two research questions are formulated: 
RQ1: What activities and resources contribute to the patent 
owner’s appropriated value in a single licensing negotiation? 
RQ2: What activities and resources contribute to the patent 
owner’s appropriated value throughout patent management? 
RQ1 focuses on the short-term perspective of a single licensing negotiation. 
It addresses the managerial question of what are the key activities and 
resources needed to appropriate value from existing patents when aiming to 
license whereas RQ2 focuses on the long-term view of the different activities 
and resources that can be used to impact the patent owning firm’s likelihood 
of generating revenue by licensing patents. By answering the research 
questions, the research problem is answered on two levels: (1) by identifying 
what a patent owning firm should invest in in a single negotiation to 
positively impact the licensing outcome, and (2) what it should invest in if it 
aims to build its patent management capability based on a licensing-focused 
strategy. 
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The research questions are answered by analysing both theoretical and 
empirical findings on licensing from literature and from expert interviews. 
The process of answering the research problem consists of three steps, that 
start from the licensing outcome, license price, in a single licensing 
negotiation and end by linking different factors impacting the licensing 
negotiation based on interviews to specific patent management activities and 
resources identified from literature as well as from the interviews (figure 1). 
The first step is conducted by presenting a game-theoretic model of license 
price formation in pure patent licensing that summarises the key factors 
affecting prices of patent licenses based on economic theory. The model is 
used to structure the interviews as well as the analysis around the research 
questions. Also, by focusing on pure patent licensing, which can be regarded 
as the theoretical foundation for patent licensing, the model helps identify 
key aspects concerning patent licensing more generally. 
 
Figure 1: Approach to analysing research questions 
The theoretical framework of the thesis including the game-theoretic 
strategic valuation model are discussed in chapter 2. Methodology is 
described in chapter 3 and the findings from interviews are discussed in 
chapter 4. In chapter 5, the answers to the research questions, theoretical and 
empirical contributions and the limitations and identified future research 
topics of the study are discussed. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. A FOCUS ON CAPABILITIES 
The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the theoretical foundations of resources and 
capabilities that will help later on when they are analysed in the specific context of 
patent licensing. First terminology is gone through after which the basic principles 
of the resource-based view will be discussed. Resource value and value creation and 
appropriation are discussed in chapter 2.1.3.  
 TERMINOLOGY 
The terminology used in this thesis is based on the definitions used by Helfat and 
Peteraf (2003). An organisational capability “refers to the ability of an organization 
to perform a coordinated set of tasks, utilizing organisational resources, for the 
purpose of achieving a particular end result” (ibid.: 999). These sets of tasks can be 
also referred to as activities or processes. To perform these activities (level 1 in 
figure 2), capabilities call upon resources (level 2 in figure 2), which can be seen as 
assets or inputs to production “that an organization owns, controls or has access to 
on a semi-permanent basis” (ibid.: 999). Capabilities can also call upon other 
capabilities (ibid.) which again call upon particular resources.   
 
Figure 2: Capability as a set of activities and resources based on Helfat and 
Peteraf (2003) 
Wernerfelt (1984, p. 172) refers to Caves (1980) as he defines resources as “those 
(tangible and intangible) assets which are tied semi-permanently to the firm”. 
Examples of tangible assets include e.g. plants, employees and liquid monetary 
assets whereas intangible assets include e.g. relationships and intellectual property. 
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Resources are not firm-specific as they can be bought from the asset market. As 
Makadok (2001: 389) argues: “If the organization were completely dissolved, its 
capabilities would also disappear, but its resources could survive in the hands of a 
new owner.” In this thesis, the resource in focus is a patent – an intangible asset, 
which can change ownership and survive as long as it is maintained properly. 
Capabilities are difficult to buy on the market without buying a company or its 
subunit (Makadok 2001). According to Teece et al. (1997: 528), because of the non-
tradability of capabilities, and soft assets in general, “they must be built”. This can 
take time as “in order for something to qualify as a capability, it must work in a 
reliable manner” (Helfat and Peteraf 2003: 999). Here, the capability in focus is 
patent management and what its critical features are that enable the appropriation of 
value from patents through licensing. 
Capabilities are usually examined as either static or dynamic, or as Helfat and 
Peteraf (2003) describe them, operational or dynamic. Operational capabilities are 
“high-level routine[s] (or collection[s] of routines) that [confer] upon an 
organization’s management a set of decision options for producing significant 
outputs of a particular type” (Winter 2000: 983). They are organized, to an extent 
repetitive, tasks or activities that are developed to meet specified objectives. 
Dynamic capabilities, on the other hand, are capabilities that develop operational 
capabilities (Teece et al. 1997), although capabilities can also develop without 
having other specific capabilities built to develop them (Helfat and Peteraf 2003). 
In this thesis, the focus is on patent management as an operational capability.  
The resource-based view literature uses also the term competence which refers to 
ways of using resources and cover such issues as management systems, processes, 
cooperation between people and ability to learn and use gained knowledge 
(Johnsson et al. 2011). In practice, resources and competencies are tied closely 
together. The effective use of resources requires competencies and similarly 
competencies should be applied to resources to produce valuable results. As the term 
is so closely linked to resources and mixes easily with capabilities, in this thesis 
mostly the two latter terms will be used. For instance, lawyers or patent engineers 
are discussed as resources with a certain skillset and an ability to learn whereas the 
coordinated use of resources will be referred to as activities or processes that 
combined form a capability. Competencies are however used as a term to analyse 
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which resources, based on interviews, are needed for patent management when a 
patent owning firm focuses on licensing. 
The terminology in the resource-based view literature is overall mixed as clear 
distinctions of what constitutes a resource, a competence and a capability are often 
evaded. Based on the definitions put to use in this chapter, resources, capabilities 
and competencies have been used to describe similar practical concepts. For 
instance, Wernerfelt (1984) mixes resources with competencies by referring to 
managerial skills as resources although it could be argued that these are in fact 
competencies and directly transmit into how the actual resources of the organisation 
(e.g. facilities, employees, intellectual property etc.) are used. Similarly, Priem and 
Butler (2001) list strategic planning as a resource although it is more of a capability 
or an activity constituting of resources (e.g. people in top management) and 
competencies (e.g. development processes). Also, to avoid mixing terms, few 
researchers have chosen to include competencies and capabilities in the same text 
(Johnsson et al. 2011).  
 THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW 
An organisation’s strategic situation can be analysed from multiple perspectives, 
focusing on the industry the firm operates in (e.g. Porter 1979), interaction with 
competitors (e.g. Shapiro 1989), the semi-permanent capabilities of the firm (e.g. 
Wernerfelt 1984) or the dynamic capabilities of the firm (e.g. Teece et al. 1997). 
The first two perspectives “share the view that rents flow from privileged product 
market positions” whereas the latter two perspectives focus on “isolating 
mechanisms as the fundamental determinants of firm performance” (Teece et al. 
1997: 510). Here, the focus is on the third perspective – the resource-based view. 
The resource-based view, introduced by Wernerfelt (1984) and contributed to by 
Barney (1986, 1991, 2001), Dierickx and Cool (1989) and others, focuses on the 
semi-permanent capabilities of the firm. It regards firms as heterogeneous in regards 
to their capabilities, sees resources as sticky and focuses on the importance of firm-
specific factors in wealth creation (Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993; 
Teece et al. 1997; Rumelt 1991).  
In the resource-based view, the wealth generated by the firm can be imputed to 
bundles of scarce resources (Lippman and Rumelt 2003b). Resources that are 
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valuable (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993), rare (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993), inimitable 
(Barney 1991; King and Zeithaml 2001) and non-substitutable (Barney 1991; 
Peteraf and Bergen 2003) are recognised as the sources of competitive advantage 
and these adjectives form Barney’s (1991) VRIN framework. Competitive 
advantage is either defined on the firm-level or on the level of an industry (Barney 
2001). In the case of the industry, competitive advantage can be defined as a firm or 
unit generating above average returns compared to the industry average (Priem and 
Butler 2001). On the firm level, the comparison is made with either current or 
potential competitors (Barney 1991) or the comparison is made with the 
expectations of shareholders (Barney 1986). 
Barney (1991) defines resource value, rarity, inimitability and non-substitutability 
followingly: Resources are valuable “when they enable a firm to conceive of or 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (ibid.: 106) and 
rare if they are possessed by fewer firms than would be needed to generate perfect 
competition dynamics in an industry. In other words, to be valuable and rare and 
thus sources for competitive advantage resources need to enable the earning of 
profits. To be a source for sustained competitive advantage, resources need to be 
also imperfectly imitable and difficult to substitute. Inimitability can be due to 
unique historical conditions through which the resource was obtained, causal 
ambiguity between the resource and the firm’s competitive advantage or the 
advantage generated being socially complex (see Dierickx and Cool 1989). 
Substitutability occurs when equivalent resources exist which can be used to 
implement the same strategies and which are either rare or inimitable. 
Dierickx and Cool (1989) extend the concept of valuable resources by focusing on 
tradability and view rare, difficult-to-price resources as valuable. According to the 
researchers, resources that are freely tradeable do not "entail a sustainable 
competitive advantage". Lippman and Rumelt (2003a; 2003b) criticise both notions. 
First, they note that factors can be valuable or valueless whether or not they be priced 
on the factor market (ibid. 2003b) and suggest that the researchers (Dierickx and 
Cool 1989) assume that resources which are tradeable hold the same value for all 
possible acquirers pointing out that resources can be wealth-enhancing although 
they are tradeable if there are superior complementarities between the resource and 
the acquirer (Conner 1991) or information among players in the asset market is 
asymmetric (Lippman and Rumelt 2003a). 
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The notion in some of the earlier work in the resource-based view has been that 
combined together the different sources of competitive advantage could be sources 
for sustained competitive advantage (Barney 1991), a concept earlier introduced by 
Porter (1985). In his 2001 article, Barney gives the example of a resource that is rare 
and valuable being a source of competitive advantage but a resource meeting all the 
criteria in the VRIN framework in addition to non-transferability (Dierickx and Cool 
1989) to be a potential source for sustained competitive advantage. This notion has 
however been criticised for assuming static capabilities as sustainable sources of 
competitive advantage in the world of business that develops and changes. 
Resources that are currently the cornerstones of a firm’s competitive advantage may 
not be such in ten or five or two years if the business landscape changes no matter 
how valuable, rare, inimitable and difficult to substitute they are at the moment. 
(Teece et al. 1997) 
Despite the criticism Barney’s VRIN framework may earn, the focus on firm-
specific capabilities in analysing wealth creation is justified as according to Rumelt 
(1991: 167), “the most important sources of economic rents are business-specific”. 
In his study of explanatory factors behind the variance in rate of returns of FTC Line 
of Business reporting units Rumelt finds that stable business unit effects are six 
times more important explainers of the dispersion of returns among business units 
(46 % of the variance) than stable industry effects are (only 8 % of the variance). In 
other words, business units differ more within industries than industries do from one 
another. 
 RESOURCE VALUE, VALUE CREATION AND 
APPROPRIATION 
Resource value has been referred to with different terms and by focusing on slightly 
different things. One way to look at the value of a resource is to think about its value 
in terms of its private value, the value it brings to its owner, and its social value, the 
value it brings to society overall. Another way to look at resource value, is to 
separate the resource’s value potential from the value it brings to its owner. Porter 
(1991) refers to potential value as the resource’s intrinsic value whereas Bowman 
and Ambrosini (2000) discuss value potential in terms of use value and the value 
the owner is able to realise as exchange value. The exchange value of a resource is 
usually measurable whereas its use value is perceived and can differ among firms.  
Theoretical framework 
10 
 
Firms differ in their ability and understanding of how to effectively use a resource. 
A way to explain the differences in firms’ perceptions of the value of a resource is 
to think of the resource value as firm idiosyncratic and depending on the market 
position, resource base and known resource complementarities prior to the exchange 
of the resource. (Schmidt and Keil 2013) This also explains why the use value of 
the resource, as in the value the resource brings to its new owner, and the exchange 
value may differ. According to Barney (1986), this occurs usually due to differences 
in understanding of the value of resources among firms or luck. A company may 
have superior information on the use value of a resource and understand to bid on 
the undervalued resource on the market or it may have come to buy a resource and 
only later on discovers the resource to be more valuable than originally believed. 
Resource value is created and appropriated by firms with their capabilities. Value 
creation refers to activities which create the perceived use value of a resource 
whereas value appropriation has to do with the firm’s ability to capture the exchange 
value of the resource (Bowman and Ambrosini 2000). Thus, how much a firm can 
possibly appropriate value in the exchange of a resource depends on how much 
perceived use value it has been able to create. How much of this use value it is able 
to appropriate depends then on its bargaining power compared with the buyer (ibid.).  
In this thesis, the focus is on the private value of patents to a patent owner who 
appropriates value from the patents through licensing. The private value depends on 
the different use values the patented technology has to the potential licensees. The 
value is realised in licensing deals where the negotiated price of the license is the 
exchange value of the patent license. In the research questions, exchange value is 
referred to as appropriated value which is analysed as the exchange value in a single 
licensing negotiation or as the sum of exchange values from separate licensing 
negotiations appropriated by the patent owner. 
2.2. PATENTS AND PATENT MANAGEMENT 
In this thesis, patents are regarded as valuable resources whose value is created and 
appropriated by the patent management capability of the patent owning firm. In the 
following chapters, basic aspects regarding patents and their use are discussed after 
which the basic activities and features of patent management are gone through. 
Lastly in chapter 2.2.4, generic patent strategies are discussed. 
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 PATENTS AS VALUABLE RESOURCES 
Innovation is costly, but once an invention has been made, the marginal costs of 
production can be very low (Scotchmer 2004; Posner 2005). Patents are value 
appropriation mechanisms which enable their owners to try to capture the value 
from expensive R&D efforts (Reitzig and Puranam 2009). Alternative appropriation 
strategies include secrecy, complementary capabilities combined with lead time and 
the use of other legal mechanisms although these may not be as notable as patents. 
(Cohen et al. 2000) Although companies often use patents in combination with 
alternative appropriation mechanisms (ibid.), the focus in this thesis is kept on 
patents and mechanisms that support their use. 
Patents protect knowledge of technological inventions which can be implemented 
in products or processes and typically last 20 years from filing0F1 the patent 
application conditional on paying renewal or maintenance fees (Scotchmer 2004). 
In order to be patentable, this knowledge needs to be new, useful and non-obvious 
and described in the claims in the patent document (Bessen and Raskind 1991; 
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 2000). However, as patents are issued 
with limited information, these requirements are important not only in determining 
validity in the granting of patents but also in overturning patents later on (Lemley 
and Shapiro 2005). On top of validity, the claims need to be interpreted to determine 
what knowledge the patent actually protects. They describe the scope and limits of 
the property right. 
Patents can be viewed as sources for competitive advantage although they do not 
necessarily fit all the criteria in the VRIN framework (Barney 1991). Patents are 
rare by definition: each patent right has to protect a unique invention or it can be 
invalidated. Patents can also be highly valuable although not all patents can be 
expected to be (Scherer and Harhoff 2000). Patents are somewhat inimitable by 
definition: they can usually be invented around but this can be very costly depending 
on the invention. Also, the substitutability of a particular patent is technology 
                                                     
1 In most countries in the world, patents are assigned on a first-to-file basis. Prior to the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (2011), the United States differed from e.g. Europe, Japan 
and Canada by determining priority by the first-to-invent rule. After the law was passed, the 
patents in the United States have also been granted to the first inventor to file the patent. 
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dependent and how well the value potential of patents is realised depends on the 
actions of the patent owning firm.  
Patent value can be seen as separate from the value of the underlying invention 
although there is a link between the two. More specifically, the value of the patent 
right is based on the counterfactual of what the owner would lose if the invention 
were not patented by the owner. This can be thought through four different 
hypothetical scenarios: “(1) the invention is not made at all, (2) the invention is 
made but a rival owns the patent, (3) the invention is made and put in the public 
domain, or (4) the inventor remains the proprietor but keeps the technology secret 
instead of patenting it”. (Scotchmer 2004: 275) The difficulty with these definitions 
of patent value is that they are based on hypotheticals. For instance, a patent owner 
will never know what the private value of its invention would have been had it put 
the invention in the public domain. The same goes for the three other scenarios. 
Some researchers have however attempted to estimate patent value with the help of 
counterfactuals. In their study of patent citations as value indicators Harhoff et al. 
(1999) made patent owners estimate the smallest price with which they would have 
sold their patent in 1980 knowing then what they knew in 1996 about the profits 
generated by the patented invention. This asset-value approach helped the 
researchers estimate the discounted profits due to “having the invention and its 
accompanying patent protection” (ibid.). 
In determining the use value of the patent to the patent owner, both the value of the 
patented invention and the patent right matter as both affect the payments that can 
be gained by holding the patent (Gambardella et al. 2006). The value of the patented 
invention is equal to the payments that can be gained in sum by market players by 
implementing the invention whereas the value of the patent right describes the 
payments the patent owner can gain by holding the exclusive right to the invention. 
In case of licensing, the value of the patented invention can be seen as the sum of 
the use values the invention brings to licensees and the value of the patent right 
reflects the payments the patent owner can gain by holding the patent to the 
invention. Thus, for a patent to be valuable to a licensor, it needs to protect a 
valuable invention. 
Both the value of the patented invention and of the patent right are affected by 
uncertainty (Lemley and Shapiro 2005). Commercial uncertainty affects how likely 
it is for the value potential of the patented invention to be reached whereas legal 
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uncertainty, which refers to the uncertainty about the validity and scope of the 
patent, affects the value potential of the patent right. Somaya (2012) refers to patents 
as “fuzzy” due to their inherent uncertainty and although patents are usually 
described as “rights to exclude” Shapiro (2003) suggests that they should be 
considered more as rights to attempt exclusion. “Roughly half of all litigated patents 
are found to be invalid” (Lemley and Shapiro 2005: 76) and even if the patents are 
found to be valid, there is still the question of scope, which needs to be interpreted 
case by case and can be interpreted differently by different judges.  
 PATENT USE 
Patents can be used in different ways by different types of companies, but the two 
main ways to appropriate returns from patenting is to either commercialise the 
patented invention and use the patent as a shield to block copying or to monetise the 
patented technology by licensing and profit with royalties (Cohen et al. 2000). These 
main use cases stem directly from patent law as patents are rights to exclude. A 
patent owner can either prohibit others from using its patented invention and thus 
profit from its market power or it can profit by selling licenses to the technology and 
thus profit from sharing this power. 
Although industry is criticised as an explanatory factor by Rumelt (1991), industry 
and field of application remain important aspects to consider when analysing patent 
use. An important question is to look at the scope of the patent in relation to the 
product or process it is implemented in. In industries where patents cover entire 
inventions, such as the chemical or pharmaceutical industries, patents are especially 
important for appropriating back the value created with years of R&D. However, in 
industries with complex products patents can cover only an incremental part of a 
product in which case patents may be needed for e.g. cross-licensing deals. (Somaya 
2012) In some of these industries patents may be used for developing standards and 
this can limit the way in which patents can be used in licensing for instance. Patent 
contributing firms may be required to sell licenses to all willing buyers with fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (as is the case with many cellular 
standards) or the companies may have decided to offer the use of their patented 
inventions for free by giving out licenses (as is the case with Bluetooth). 
Patents are owned and used by different types of companies, which impacts their 
use. In general, patent owners fall into two categories: practicing and non-practicing 
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entities (NPEs). Practicing entities are vertically-integrated manufacturers that use 
their patented inventions in their own products or processes and can therefore use 
the patent for both commercialisation and licensing. Some NPEs on the other hand 
hold only the right to the invention and can thus appropriate returns only with 
licensing or other means than commercialisation. In literature and in public 
discourse, NPEs are often referred to as “patent trolls” (e.g. Fischer and Henkel 
2012; Lemley 2008; Reitzig et al. 2007) due to their attempts and ability to hold-up 
or add costs to firms implementing their patents. 
Although commercialisation and monetisation by licensing are listed here as the two 
main use cases of patents, patents like so many other assets can be traded and 
transferred among firms. The transfer of patents can occur in mergers and 
acquisitions or they may be sold separately. The original owner may not always be 
the best in profiting from its invention or understanding all the ways in which it 
could be used (Scotchmer 1991) and in these cases selling the patent can be more 
profitable than holding it. Monetisation can therefore occur also in the form of patent 
sales. 
 PATENT MANAGEMENT 
Patent management can be seen as the set of activities and resources that support the 
creation and appropriation of the value of the patent right. Reitzig and Puranam 
(2009) study these capabilities in the context of patent filing, an early activity in the 
so-called IP value chain (figure 3), which consists of three IP related activities: IP 
generation, IP protection and IP utilisation. The first activity, IP generation, is an 
upstream activity consisting of research and development efforts that generate 
patentable inventions and is described by the researchers as the value creating 
activity in the value chain. The following activities, IP protection and IP utilisation, 
are downstream activities concerned with value appropriation and contain the 
activities that form the patent management capability of the firm. 
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Figure 3: IP value chain (based on Reitzig and Puranam 2009) 
Somaya (2012) refers to the different activity domains of patent management as 
“rights”, “enforcement” and “licensing” (figure 4). The first activity domain, rights, 
consists of the different activities involved with building and maintaining a firm’s 
patent portfolio. Depending on the firm, it can include patenting inventions by the 
firm or the purchase of patents from other firms as well as the decisions to renew or 
discontinue patents in the portfolio. Enforcement is defined by Somaya (2012: 1089) 
as the “use or threatened use of litigation to stop [use of] patented inventions or to 
[get an infringer to] pay royalties” and described as a “potentially […] expensive 
multi-stage game”. In this thesis, rights and enforcement form the IP protection 
activity in the IP value chain. Of the two, rights describe more the administrative 
activities occurring in an IP organisation whereas some patent enforcement 
activities such as litigation can be more incidental. 
 
Figure 4: Patent management activities by Somaya (2012) 
The third activity domain, licensing, refers to the activities involved with the sharing 
of patent rights through agreements. Depending on the industry and patent strategy 
of the firm, it can involve activities relating to e.g. cross-licensing, standard setting, 
open innovation or patent pooling. (Somaya 2012) Overall, it involves activities 
such as the identification of potential licensees, which can be an activity shared 
between licensing and enforcement, as well as the negotiation of agreements and the 
development of the firm’s licensing program (Smith and Parr 2005). 
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In this thesis, licensing is part of the IP utilisation activity in the IP value chain, 
which includes also the activities involved with the commercialisation of patented 
inventions by implementing them in products or processes. In a simple case in which 
one firm licenses the use of its patented technology to another, implementation can 
be regarded as the final stage in the IP value chain and would consist of activities 
by the licensee. In figure 5, the activity domains described by Somaya (2012) and 
Reitzig and Puranam (2009) are combined to form the basic structure of the IP value 
chain in patent licensing. The activity domains coloured green (rights, enforcement 
and licensing) form the patent owning firm’s patent management capability. 
 
Figure 5: Activities in the IP value chain in patent licensing context 
The different patent management activities call upon at least three distinct 
underlying capabilities: technological, legal and business capabilities (Reitzig and 
Puranam 2009; Smith and Parr 2005). Technological capability is needed especially 
in IP protection activities and is provided by engineers from the research and 
development function and patent attorneys specialised in the technical-legal 
questions related to patenting, patent maintenance and enforcement (Reitzig and 
Puranam 2009). Legal capability is required in all the three patent management 
activity domains and is provided by patent attorneys and lawyers specialised in e.g. 
patent law, litigation or drafting of agreements. Business capability is needed on the 
other hand especially in the IP utilisation activities where business development 
activities (e.g. analysing markets and business opportunities) or licensing (e.g. 
negotiating deals, determining royalties) are involved. (Ibid.; Smith and Parr 2005)  
For an organisation to execute all the activities in the IP value chain (figure 5), all 
three capabilities (technological, legal and business) need to be at the firm’s 
disposal. In addition, effective patent management entails both specialisation and 
coordination of tasks among experts from different specialised activities in the IP 
value chain. Reitzig and Puranam (2009) find in their study on patenting outcomes 
that the speed at which firm’s get patents granted is affected by the level of 
functional specialisation of firm’s activities throughout the IP value chain and that 
the functional specialisation effect is inversely U-shaped: specialisation and 
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specialised experts from different capabilities (technological, legal and business) as 
well as coordination are required to get patents granted fast. Both lack of 
specialisation and, on the contrary, lack of coordination lead to slower patent grants. 
 GENERIC PATENT STRATEGIES 
Patent owning firms follow mostly three generic patent strategies that are based on 
their focus of appropriating returns from patents (commercialisation or 
monetisation) and the differences in the firms’ strategic contexts. The generic 
strategies are the proprietary strategy, the defensive strategy and the leveraging 
strategy. The proprietary and the defensive strategies are pursued by practicing 
entities who aim to appropriate value from their patents by commercialising 
patented inventions. The leveraging strategy on the other hand is built around 
monetisation, typically in the form of licensing and is the generic strategy in focus 
in this thesis. (Somaya 2012) 
The proprietary strategy is based on protecting strategically important inventions as 
tightly as possible and is perhaps the strategy traditionally thought of when 
considering patent use and value appropriation (Teece 1986). It is also referred to as 
the offensive strategy and based on proactively improving the patent owning firm’s 
proprietary position by limiting competition in key technology markets. The 
proprietary strategy is usually implemented in technology spaces where individual 
patent owners can create patent fences around entire technological solutions and 
where close substitutes are few or difficult to come by. An example of an industry 
where the proprietary strategy is common is pharmaceuticals where new drugs are 
protected heavily to ensure a monopolistic position once they enter the market. 
(Somaya 2012) 
The defensive strategy is a by-product of technology markets characterised by 
complexity and incremental innovation such as the telecommunications industry. 
Due to the high risk of hold-up, firms need to use patents to defend “against patents 
owned (and potentially enforced) by others” (Somaya 2012: 1093). When multiple 
technological inventions are involved in a single product and there are many firms 
with patents to these inventions, holding some of the patents levels the playing field 
– if another firm attempts to exclude others from the market, those with their own 
rights to exclude can impose a similar threat. In essence, the defensive strategy is 
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thus built around ensuring freedom of operation and the role of patents is to prevent 
lawsuits and to work as bargaining chips. (Ibid.) 
The leveraging strategy aims to monetise patents typically through licensing as 
opposed to commercialising them and is pursued by firms when following a 
proprietary or a defensive strategy is either infeasible or unnecessary. For instance, 
a firm pursuing a leveraging strategy may lack its own manufacturing capability (as 
is the case with NPEs), the patents included in the strategy may cover technologies 
that are not central to the firm’s product market strategy but be still valuable1F2 or 
they can be easily invented around and therefore unfitting to a proprietary strategy. 
On the other hand, for instance due to holdup asymmetry2F3, the firm may be able to 
leverage its patent position in licensing negotiations so as to make following a purely 
defensive strategy unnecessary. (Somaya 2012) In general, firms have incentives to 
pursue a leveraging strategy based on licensing if it enables them to capture a larger 
share of total profits in the market than by following a proprietary or defensive 
strategy (Arora and Fosfuri 2003).  
Somaya (2012) refers to the high costs of the different patent activity domains 
(rights, enforcement and licensing as described in chapter 2.2.3) as he suggests that 
a patent owning firm ought to prioritise the activities based on the patent strategy 
the firm aims to follow. For instance, the costs of patenting differ by patent and by 
country but include at least the fees for the filing, examination, granting and 
prosecution of the patent, the costs for having a patent attorney work on the patent, 
the costs of translation and the maintenance fees paid during the lifetime of the 
patent. In Germany alone, these costs added up to approximately $32,000 based on 
estimates made in 2010. As patent protection is usually sought from several regions, 
the costs per a single patent family can rise to hundreds of thousands of dollars. The 
                                                     
2 Rivette and Kline (2000) discuss these types of patents in their book Rembrandts in the 
Attic. They’re notion is that firms should consider appropriating value from all of their 
patents, not just the ones currently valuable to them in their commercial products or 
processes, as some of the patents may for instance cover technologies that are valuable to 
other firms and that way be potentially valuable to the patent owner. 
3 Somaya (2012) refers to holdup asymmetry as one of the explanatory factors for a patent 
owning firm to pursue a leveraging strategy. In practice, holdup asymmetry occurs for 
instance when an NPE threatens manufacturers with patent enforcement to generate 
licensing income. The asymmetry comes from the fact that the NPE has the potential to halt 
the manufacturers’ production with court orders but cannot be threatened with similar 
actions by the manufacturers if it doesn’t operate in the product market. 
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costs of litigation differ by country as well, ranging from tens of thousands of dollars 
(e.g. in Germany) to millions of dollars (e.g. in the United States) and being higher 
the larger the damages involved. (Park 2010) On top of the costs of patenting and 
maintaining a portfolio and enforcement, transaction costs which are part of 
licensing and other organisational costs such as the time of company employees 
from other functions than patent management need to be considered to get an overall 
view of the costs of patent management (Somaya 2012). The main characteristics of 
the three generic patent strategies and how these affect the approach taken in the 
different activity domains are condensed in table 1. 
Table 1: Activities in generic patent strategies (based on Somaya 2012) 
 
In the proprietary strategy, the general emphasis is on IP protection activities. 
Money, time and effort is invested in building as “watertight” a shield as possible 
around strategically important inventions and enforcement is built around detecting 
and blocking infringement. Licensing patented technologies is not in focus in the 
proprietary strategy and may not be a required function (as in the defensive strategy) 
due to the strength of protection and in the case of a lack of close substitutes to the 
patented invention. (Arora and Fosfuri 2003; Somaya 2012) As in the proprietary 
strategy, in the defensive strategy emphasis on IP protection is high. However, in 
the defensive strategy licensing plays a key role as other firms’ possibility to halt 
production through litigation needs to be overcome with agreements. (Shapiro 2000; 
Somaya 2012) 
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In the leveraging strategy licensing is the key activity with the other activity domains 
built around it. When other activities are built around the licensing function, as in 
the leveraging strategy, the rights and enforcement activities are organised around 
creating demand for license agreements. (Somaya 2012) This suggests maintaining 
the patent portfolio based on other firms’ needs for the patented technologies instead 
of only on one’s own and using the threat of litigation to generate demand for patent 
licenses and to get other firms to pay royalties for implementing patented 
technologies. Although NPEs have been studied a lot as examples of firms operating 
by the leveraging strategy (e.g. Reitzig et al. 2007; Reitzig et al. 2010), the work of 
Arora and Fosfuri (2003) suggests that also firms competing in the product market 
and conducting R&D can pursue a leveraging strategy and thus build their patent 
management with a licensing focus. 
2.3. VALUATION MODELS FOR LICENSING 
In this thesis, value appropriation occurs in the context of licensing where patent 
value is realised through the exchange value of patent licenses. In this chapter, 
general patent valuation models used for licensing are first discussed after which the 
strategic valuation model describing factors impacting license prices is presented. 
The model serves as the basis for analysis in the empirical part of this thesis and is 
the foundation for linking different activities and resources from the patent 
management capability to patent licensing outcomes. 
 LICENSING VALUATION METHODS 
Patent value can be realised in different situations where patent valuations are 
required. Patent valuations are needed for firm-external reasons for instance in 
determining damages in an infringement suit, in licensing negotiations, in mergers 
and acquisitions, in bankruptcies, in collateral-based financing for loans, in 
determining relative ownership in alliance formation or for taxation purposes in 
intercompany transactions (Smith and Parr 2005: 7-8). Also, patent valuations may 
be conducted internally for portfolio management purposes (e.g. Reitzig 2004) or 
by economists researching the functioning of the innovation system (e.g. Scherer 
and Harhoff 2000). As the focus in this thesis is on licensing negotiations, licensing 
valuation methods will be discussed in more detail. In their review of literature 
Lerner and Layne-Farrar (2006) discuss five basic licensing valuation methods: 
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rules of thumb, the cost method, the market method, the discounted cash flow 
method and options pricing methods.  
The purpose of the different licensing valuation methodologies is to determine a 
price or use value for a patent license. How the payments to pay for the license are 
structured can however be implemented in different ways. The agreement could 
include an upfront payment, royalty payments or both and might also be arranged 
to include equity or milestone payments. A lot of literature emphasises the use of 
upfront payments but their use in practice can be difficult; for instance, how to come 
up with a fair price that considers the commercial uncertainty related to the patented 
technology? Therefore, upfront payments are often accompanied or replaced with 
royalty payments which mitigate the uncertainty for both the licensor and the 
licensee. (Lerner and Layne-Farrar 2006) In practice, "patent licenses usually 
involve a combination of pricing terms" (ibid.: 13). For simplicity, the different 
payments are lumped here together and referred to from now on as the price of the 
license. 
Rules of thumb or heuristics have been used widely in licensing negotiations (Lerner 
and Layne-Farrar 2006; Goldscheider, Jarosz and Mulhern 2005). The most famous 
rule of thumb is the Goldscheider rule (also known as the 25% rule) which suggests 
that the “licensee pay a royalty rate equivalent to 25% of its expected profits for the 
product that incorporates the intellectual property at issue” (Goldscheider, Jarosz 
and Mulhern 2005: 410). Another rule of thumb type method is the cost method 
which estimates the price of a patent by adding an arbitrary profit margin to the cost 
of developing and patenting the underlying invention. Valuation heuristics have 
been criticised for over-simplifying patent valuation (Lerner and Layne-Farrar 
2006) and discredited in court for damages calculations (Uniloc USA, Inc. vs 
Microsoft Corp. 2011 on the 25 % rule). Importantly, they ignore the private value 
of the patent right and disregard the fact that patent values aren’t normally 
distributed but highly skewed (ibid.; Scherer and Harhoff 2000; Pakes 1986). They 
also ignore how licenses are used in practice and what the relative bargaining powers 
of the parties in the negotiation are (Lerner and Layne-Farrar 2006). 
The market method anchors the range of possible prices for a patent with 
information of agreements on similar technologies (Lerner and Layne-Farrar 2006). 
It can also be referred to as the comparables method. The idea behind the market 
method is relatively sound and the method is in theory simple to use. However, 
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benchmarking patent prices is challenging for two main reasons: information on 
license agreements and paid prices for patents are usually not publicly available and 
the identification of non-clouded comparable agreements is difficult. (Ibid.; Smith 
and Parr 2005: 669-674). When a license agreement on a similar technology is 
available, many aspects of the “agreement must be analyzed for the royalty 
provision to be a useful proxy” (Smith and Parr 2005: 674). For instance, 
independence and bargaining powers of the negotiating parties need to be assessed 
before accepting the agreement as a proxy (ibid.: 669-674). Possibly due to the 
challenges of finding true comparables, the market method has been applied loosely 
using industry average royalty rates as proxies. However, using such averages for 
anchoring a price is similar to using another rule of thumb: the method is fairly 
simple to apply but crude and risks leaving money on the table. (Pitkethly 1997) 
The discounted cash flow method is a type of income method which looks at patent 
price as the present value of the future stream of payments resulting from licensing 
the patent. The method attempts to estimate the value added by the patented 
invention in products or processes, which makes the method theoretically sound but 
less straightforward to use than the market method or rules of thumb. (Lerner and 
Layne-Farrar 2006) "Separating the value added by an invention, as opposed to 
other factors affecting sales and profitability, can be quite difficult" (ibid.: 10). This 
can be especially challenging with complex technologies were multiple patented 
inventions provide a specific function. Also, as the portion of payments accountable 
to the patented invention is an exogenous variable in the method, DCF suits the 
explanation of factors impacting the price of a license poorly.  
Options pricing methods are income methods similarly to the discounted cash flow 
method. At their core, they are “permutations of the basic DCF methodology” 
(Smith and Parr 2005: 493). Options pricing methods include such methods as 
Monte Carlo simulations and the Black-Scholes solution. As valuation methods they 
are more complex than the ones discussed earlier but their advantage is that they 
consider the uncertainty related to patent value. (Lerner and Layne-Farrar 2006) 
Their challenge lies in their inputs and assumptions. For instance, the Black-Scholes 
solution assumes log-normal distributions for the underlying asset (Black and 
Scholes 1973), which is unlikely in the case of patent licensing. In addition, the 
Black-Scholes solution in its original form also disregards the bargaining powers 
that are likely to affect the exchange value of a patent license (Denton and Heald 
Theoretical framework 
23 
 
2003). Although the Denton Variation of Black-Scholes (ibid.) aims to consider 
these bargaining powers, it still lacks consideration of the clearest alternative to 
licensing to a potential infringer: litigation.  
Each of the valuation methods have their limitations and as information about the 
intrinsic value of a patent is usually far from perfect, the price of a license is “thus 
the result of a negotiation, rather than agreement on a calculation” (Bidault 1989: 
50). On top of this, the valuations conducted on each side of the negotiation may 
reflect the differing interests of the negotiating parties (Smith and Parr 2005: 518-
523). The patent owner wishes to maximise the value of its patent and perhaps gain 
back its heavy R&D investment whereas the infringer or potential licensee wishes 
to minimise the price it has to pay for using the patented invention in its products or 
processes. As the sides are likely to differ in their interests and their initial demands 
for what the price of a license should be based on their own valuations, negotiating 
is required to come up with a price both parties can agree on. The strategic valuation 
model, represented in the next chapter, considers the roles of negotiation under the 
threat of litigation and uncertainty in determining exchange values for patent 
licenses. As a game-theoretic model, it is limited in practical use by its requirements 
for data, but as a theoretic model it is assumed to depict the factors impacting 
payments to be gained with licenses better than the valuation models described in 
this chapter. 
 STRATEGIC VALUATION MODEL 
The strategic valuation model represents the context in which a firm aims to realise 
the value of its intellectual property through licensing. The model considers many 
of the key aspects from literature that have to do with determining the exchange 
value of a patent in a licensing context such as uncertainty and bargaining power 
and acts as the starting point for the interviews described in chapter 3. It assumes 
that the determined price of a patent license is the result of a negotiation and can 
thus be modeled with game theory. The model represents the function of the 
exchange value of a patent license which depends on the use value of the patented 
technology to the licensee. It depicts only a portion of the private value the patent 
brings to its owner but is an important starting point for analysing how patent 
management as a capability can be built around appropriating value through 
licensing.  
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The strategic valuation model presented here is an adaptation of the model of 
Shapiro (2010). In the model, two firms, a patent owner (the plaintiff) and a potential 
infringer (the defendant), take part in an infringement dispute that leads to a 
negotiation on a license fee (referred to as price of the license). The parties are 
assumed to be rational, cost-minimising players with imperfect but symmetric 
information on the factors impacting the negotiation.  
For simplicity, the patent owner is assumed to be a non-practicing entity and the 
potential infringer a downstream manufacturer. The manufacturer has a productive 
asset that potentially infringes on the patent owner’s patent. The discounted cash-
flow from the manufacturer’s asset is denoted by 𝜋𝜋, 𝜋𝜋 > 0 and reflects the use value 
of the patent to the manufacturer. For the patent owner, whom this thesis focuses 
on, 𝜋𝜋 is assumed to be an exogenous variable as it depends on the capabilities and 
business circumstances of the manufacturer.  
The licensing negotiation takes place in the shadow of litigation: the patent owner 
has the option of taking the patent implementor to court due to infringement if a 
settlement cannot be reached. The strength of the patent is probabilistic as described 
in chapter 2.2.1. If the firms litigate and the litigation leads to a judgement, the 
plaintiff will win and the court will find the patent valid and infringed with 
probability 𝜃𝜃, 𝜃𝜃 ∈ [0,1]. Accordingly, the defendant will win with probability 1 −
𝜃𝜃. The defendant wins if the court finds the patent invalid or the technology in 
question to be outside the scope of the claims of the patent. In case the plaintiff wins, 
the legal remedy considered is an injunction. The losing side is assumed to pay the 
total costs of litigation3F4 𝑐𝑐, 𝑐𝑐 > 0. 
As rational, cost-minimising players, the parties prefer to avoid the costs of 
litigation. Thus, they settle out of the court and negotiate on a license fee. The 
negotiation follows Rubinstein’s strategic bargaining where the threat points are 
pinned down by the expected court outcomes. The bargaining power of the patent 
owner is denoted by 𝛽𝛽, 𝛽𝛽 ∈ [0,1] and the manufacturer by 1 − 𝛽𝛽. The bargaining 
powers refer both to licensing negotiations in the settlement phase as well as 
                                                     
4 The assumption is based on the English rule used in European countries and many other 
jurisdictions in the world (Eisenberg and Miller 2013). 
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following judgement from trial. In the negotiation each side may make a take-it-or-
leave-it offer by probability equal to its bargaining power. 
The negotiation is the result of a game illustrated by the game tree in figure 6. First, 
the patent owner who has noticed potential infringement decides whether to 
approach the manufacturer with a notice of infringement and ask for a license fee. 
Sending of the notice starts the negotiation. Second, if the parties do not settle out 
of court, the patent owner has to decide whether to litigate. If the patent owner 
decides to litigate, a trial takes place. The negotiated price of the license 𝑝𝑝 is solved 
backwards from the game tree by looking for subgame perfect equilibria.  
 
Figure 6: The game tree 
If the parties go to court, the manufacturer will win with probability 1 − 𝜃𝜃 in which 
case the manufacturer will keep 𝜋𝜋 and the patent owner receives nothing and has to 
pay the costs of litigation 𝑐𝑐. With probability 𝜃𝜃 the patent owner wins and the court 
order an injunction. In subsequent licensing negotiations, with probability 𝛽𝛽 the 
patent owner will be able to extract royalties equal to 𝜋𝜋 whereas with probability 1 − 𝛽𝛽 the patent owner receives no royalties. The expected licensing revenue to the 
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patent owner is therefore 𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋 and the expected remaining cash-flow to the 
manufacturer (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋. Since the manufacturer lost the case in court, it has to pay 
the total costs of litigation 𝑐𝑐. As the patent owner was expected to win with 
probability 𝜃𝜃, the expected payoffs from going to court for the patent owner and the 
manufacturer are:  
�
 P: 𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑐𝑐 M: (1 − 𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋 − 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐 
To ensure that the threat of litigation is credible, it is assumed that on expected terms 
going to court is profitable for the patent owner, i.e., 𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑐𝑐 > 0. As 𝑐𝑐 >0, the three other parameters must also be strictly positive. Although going to court 
is profitable to the patent owner, the parties prefer to settle out of the court because 
of the positive litigation costs 𝑐𝑐. Therefore, a trial never takes place in equilibrium. 
This is in line with empirical findings that indicate that only a small fraction of 
patent cases is actually litigated (e.g. Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001). 
In the out-of-the-court negotiation, the patent owner proposes a license price 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 
which makes the manufacturer just indifferent between going to court and coming 
up with an agreement. Thus, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 must satisfy the condition 𝜋𝜋 − 𝑝𝑝 = (1 − 𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋 −
𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐, which yields 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 = 𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋 + 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐. Accordingly, the manufacturer’s proposal  𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀 
must make the patent owner indifferent between going to court and accepting a 
license price. Thus, 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀 = 𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑐𝑐.  
The patent owner’s expected payoff is given by  
𝑝𝑝∗ = 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝛽(𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋 + 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑐𝑐)= 𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑐𝑐 
which is also the price predicted by the model. The exchange value of the patent 
license depends therefore on the use value of the license to the manufacturer (𝜋𝜋), 
case strength (𝜃𝜃), and the bargaining powers and costs of litigation of the negotiating 
parties (𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐). In other words, the licensing outcome is impacted by the use value of 
the patent, the expectations regarding litigation and the capabilities impacting the 
bargaining positions of the negotiating parties. What the model presented here does 
not explain, is what impacts these parameters in practice and which activities and 
resources should patent management focus on to appropriate value from patents 
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through licensing negotiations. For this purpose, patent management experts were 
interviewed and the methodology and findings are described in chapters 3 and 4. 
2.4. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM LITERATURE 
Following the logic of the resource-based view (RBV) presented in chapter 2.1., 
patent management can be analysed as an organisational capability which consists 
of organised activities that call upon internal or external resources and other 
capabilities to achieve a target outcome. In this thesis, the target outcome is that of 
value appropriation from patents by licensing. Patents on the other hand, can be 
regarded as intangible assets, which can be valuable to their owner but the value of 
which is affected by both commercial and legal uncertainty (Lemley and Shapiro 
2005). Their use value to the patent owner depends on the commercial significance 
of the technological inventions they cover and on their properties as intellectual 
property rights (their scope and validity) as well as on the complementary assets and 
actions of the patent owner. 
Based on Bowman and Ambrosini’s (2000) definitions of value creation and value 
appropriation, value appropriation in patent licensing can be analysed as the patent 
owning firm’s ability to capture the exchange value of the patent license. Key factors 
contributing to the exchange value of the license, which is the same as the price of 
the license, were summarised with the strategic valuation model, which was based 
on work by Shapiro (2010). The model, which depicts a pure patent licensing 
negotiation with a patent owner and a potential implementor, highlights four factors 
that a patent owning firm should consider when deciding whether to participate in 
and how to prepare for licensing:  
• the use value of the license to the potential implementor (referred to as 
discounted cash-flow from asset),  
• the legal strength of the patent owner’s case if it needs to be taken to court 
(referred to as case strength),  
• the bargaining position of the patent owner in terms of its relative 
capabilities compared to the potential implementor (referred to as 
bargaining power) and  
• litigation costs which both negotiating parties are assumed to want to avoid 
paying. 
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The strategic valuation model portrays the factors as given, but does not link them 
to specific activities or resources outside the negotiation. On the other hand, activity 
domains relevant to patent licensing were identified from literature that were not 
linked to individual licensing negotiations and their outcomes. Patent management 
was recognised to consist of three activity domains referred to by Somaya (2012) as 
rights, enforcement and licensing. These form the IP protection and utilisation 
activities of the patent licensor’s IP value chain (based on the concepts of Reitzig 
and Puranam 2009). From the patent licensor’s perspective, the protective activities 
in the rights domain could be focused on patents covering technologies with 
commercial demand in the market and license demand could be generated with 
patent enforcement through the threat of litigation. In addition, the detection of 
infringement is expected to be also an activity contributing to patent licensing as it 
could be used to detect potential licensees and that way demand in the market. 
To bridge the gap between the theoretic factors contributing to licensing outcomes 
and the activity domains forming patent management, interviews with patent 
management experts were conducted. With these interviews practical factors 
explaining license price formation as well as activities and resources impacting these 
factors were identified. The interviews and their findings are discussed in the 
following chapters.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
To analyse the factors that impact value appropriation in patent licensing 
negotiations, a strategic valuation model was formed (described in chapter 2.3.2) 
and 13 interviews with patent management experts were conducted between June 
and August of 2017. The interviews were used to explain practical issues impacting 
the theoretical factors contributing to license price (depicted by the strategic 
valuation model) and to fill a framework (consisting of the factors contributing to 
license price and patent management activity domains identified from literature) to 
answer the research questions of the thesis. In this chapter, the main focus is in 
describing the methodological choices of the empirical part of the study: the 
methods for the interviews and their analysis are discussed in chapters 3.1-3.3. The 
methodology for answering the research questions, based on both findings from 
literature and from interviews, is then discussed in chapter 3.4. 
3.1. DATA GATHERING 
The purpose of the data gathering was to get insights on factors impacting value 
appropriation in patent licensing (the theoretical factors are given by the strategic 
valuation model described in chapter 2.3.2) from patent management experts with 
broad experience in the field. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the 
research method to support the descriptive nature of the study and for the benefit of 
choosing interviews over questionnaires, in this case, as well as to help with the 
analysis.  
 SAMPLING 
The sampling was purposive to reach interviewees with significant professional 
experience with patent management related issues. As patent use and the role of 
licensing differs across firms (see chapter 2.2.2), different types of firms and their 
representatives were sent an invitation to be interviewed (one invite / representative 
per firm). Patent owning firms that were expected to follow rather strict proprietary 
strategies, such as pharmaceutical companies, were not contacted due to the low 
expected emphasis on licensing. However, some of the interviews included answers 
indicating proprietary strategies and were included in the study as they included also 
important information regarding licensing and for instance of being the target of 
licensing-focused firms. 
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To get face-to-face interviews and therefore for convenience reasons, the invites 
were sent to representatives of mostly Finnish companies residing in Finland. To 
gain a comprehensive, descriptive outlook on patent management factors impacting 
licensing, interviewees were recruited from two different perspectives to patent 
management: the strategy perspective represented by managers of patent owning 
firms and the activity perspective represented by consultants of patent services 
providing firms (figure 7). This was based on the rational that the managers would 
have a broad look of the implementation of different activities as part of distinct 
patent strategies in the context of the firm or industry they represented whereas the 
consultants would have been more focused on distinct activities but serving a wide 
range of firms, industries and different patent strategies. Of course, the interviewees 
could have experience from both being a manager and a consultant (as was also the 
case with at least one of the interviewed consultants). 
 
Figure 7: Interviewees’ expected perspectives on patent management (based 
on constructs described in chapter 2.2) 
Seven of the 13 interviewees were managers from different patent owning firms, all 
but one working at the firm at the time of the interview and one having worked for 
the firm within a year from the interview. The managers were either heads of their 
units, heads of the IP team, heads of licensing or the person responsible for IP related 
activities in their company. The companies discussed represented different 
industries, different entity types (manufacturers, NPEs or both) and implemented 
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different generic patent strategies. They had also patent-portfolios of different sizes. 
In the sample, the firms that aimed to monetise their patents also operated as NPEs 
for the part of the portfolio that they aimed to monetise. The other firms used patents 
mainly to support the commercialisation of their products or processes. However, 
also these firms had background with licensing efforts, both as licensors and 
licensees. (Table 2) The rest of the interviewees were consultants from companies 
providing patent related services. The companies they worked for focused on 
different patent management activities: patenting related patent-technical issues, 
legal questions related to patents (especially litigation and contractual issues) and 
patent use and strategy related questions. (Table 3) 
Table 2: Background information of interviewed managers 
 
Table 3: Background information of interviewed consultants 
 
The academic backgrounds of the interviewees were mostly from the fields of 
technology or law (some having degrees in both). One of the consultants had 
graduated with a business degree and at least one of the managers had done an MBA. 
All had extensive professional experience with patent-related issues, ranging from 
over 10 to over 20 years at the time of the interviews. (Tables 2 and 3) 
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 DATA COLLECTION 
Vuori (2018) mentions the richness of information gathered and the possibility to 
add questions during the data gathering process (if something in the answers wasn’t 
clear or if an interesting point would be raised by an interviewee) as benefits of 
conducting interviews with open-ended questions as opposed to using e.g. a static 
questionnaire. Based on discussions with former colleagues of some of the 
interviewees, it was also expected that it would be easier to get the experts to answer 
questions by booking an interview with them than by asking them to fill out a 
questionnaire. The possibility to modify the questions if the original wordings could 
be noticed not to be working based on the interviewees’ responses was also seen as 
a benefit for using interviewees over questionnaires. To help with the analysis and 
comparison of what factors were discussed in each interview and to enable 
quantification of mentions in the data, the interview guide was structured (appendix 
1) and the interviews overall conducted following a semi-structured approach. 
As Vuori (2018: 67) points out, “highly educated managers as interviewees are not 
naïve”. Thus, the questions in the interviews were posed so that they recognised the 
expertise of the interviewees (e.g. not asking questions about basic elements of 
patent law but stating them before discussing the question needed to be answered) 
and were aimed at making the interview conversational (e.g. in the interviews with 
more time or in which the main questions in the interview guide would be gone 
through promptly, additional topics would be discussed referring to literature or 
factors raised from prior interviews). To avoid leading the interviewees, the main 
interview questions were ordered by topic so that broader questions would start each 
topic to get each interviewee’s initial response to particular themes before going into 
more specific questions on factors already thought of by the interviewer. 
As all interviewees as well as the interviewer were Finnish, the interviews were 
conducted in Finnish.  Most of the interviews were held in company premises of the 
interviewees apart from two interviews which were conducted on the phone due to 
scheduling challenges. All of the interviews were recorded and later on transcribed 
word-for-word. As the focus was on manifest content (the themes and points that 
were mentioned by the interviewees), latent content described by Elo and Kyngäs 
(2008) as e.g. laughter or long pauses were not included in the transcripts. 
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The number of interviews was sufficient to reach saturation as each main point that 
was strictly related to the factors of the strategic valuation model was mentioned by 
at least two interviewees and no relevant new information for the general 
understanding of the patent licensing context came from the last interview. 
However, some context and discipline specific points concerning licensing-focused 
patent management were made by individual interviewees which were discussed to 
broaden the general understanding of the writer of patent management related issues 
and to inform the analysis linking identified factors contributing to patent 
management to aspects of patent management. 
Each interviewee was asked whether their name and the name of the firm they 
worked for could be mentioned in the thesis. All but one agreed to this - however, 
two legal consultants wished to highlight that the points they made during the 
interview were theirs and shouldn't be portrayed as representing the views of the 
firm they work for. As such, the interviews were, a part from one, conducted with 
the assumption that the interviewee names and firms would be published as part of 
the study. However, as one interviewee didn't want this information to be made 
public, it was afterwards decided that all interviewees would be referred to with 
pseudonyms. 
The fact that the interviewees weren't promised anonymity probably impacted some 
of their answers regarding their companies and may have impacted the level in 
which the interview topics were discussed. However, as the aim of the interviews 
was to get a descriptive view of factors impacting licensing, and not to necessarily 
test theory, and it was expected that sensitive information regarding prior or ongoing 
cases would not be discussed by the interviewees, this shouldn't have compromised 
the results and the data should be sufficient in its level of detail to enable answering 
the research questions. 
3.2. INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 STRUCTURE AND FORMULATION 
The interviews were conducted using two versions of a semi-structured interview 
guide. The first version of the guide (appendix 1) was used for the interviews with 
the managers and a modified version of this guide was used for the interviews with 
the consultants. The main differences in the two versions have to do with the 
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background questions and the point of view when discussing patent use: managers 
are asked about their own business whereas consultants are asked about what 
they’ve come across when working in the market for their clients. As managers are 
asked background questions about how their firms use patents, the consultants are 
asked about the types of patent management activities their firms focus on. 
Due to the limited time for each interview, the interview guide focuses on patent 
management recourses in each firms’ disposal and the case strength and bargaining 
power from the strategic valuation model (described in chapter 2.3.2). The 
discounted-cash flow from asset is an exogenous variable in the model, and was 
therefore not included in the interview guide. Litigation costs on the other hand were 
represented as significant in the literature and information on them could be found 
well online so they weren’t included in the interview guide. The topic of litigation 
costs was included in the interviews with the consultants from law firms but not in 
the other interviews as it wasn’t a topic that needed further information from all the 
interviewees to answer the research questions.  
The interview guide was gone through with an expert in the field to see if there 
where relevant themes and questions missing and to get a sense before the interviews 
of what might be challenging to get answers to and how to word the questions so as 
to get answers. Based on this discussion and from discussions with other people 
with a patent management background as well as on findings from literature (Lerner 
and Layne-Farrar 2006; Smith and Parr 2005: 669-674), it was clear that the 
interviewees would be highly unlikely to discuss ongoing cases. Because of this, the 
questions focused on the general level of conducting patent management and 
licensing. As an example, instead of asking about particular cases, the interviewees 
were asked about typical cases when discussing their own business or the business 
of their clients. 
The purpose of the interview guide was to give a similar structure to the different 
interviews and make sure that each theme would be covered in each interview. The 
questions were there to help the interviewer in case the interviewee would go off 
topic or the conversation wouldn’t flow as planned. The questions could be phrased 
differently than in the guide, as long as the topics got covered. As the time to be 
used for each interview and the interviewees interests varied, certain topics were 
emphasised more in some interviews than in others. The topic that was dropped in 
some interviews due to time constraints was the description of the firm’s typical 
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case. Based on experience from the first interviews, this was noticed to be least 
essential to the way the interviewees answered the other questions although it 
worked as helpful background information for analysing the interviews. A topic that 
was added in some of the interviews conducted later on was which activities from 
the patent value chain could be outsourced. 
 BACKGROUND QUESTIONS 
The background questions were aimed at discovering from which angle the 
managers and consultants looked at patent management in their usual work to get a 
better sense of their answers. To understand better the way the patent management 
capability of each firm was formed and the importance of licensing to each firm, the 
managers were asked what the firms focused on in patent use (commercialisation or 
monetisation) and whether they were practicing entities (especially in those areas in 
which they focused on monetisation). Based on the strategic valuation model 
(represented in chapter 2.3.2), licensing was expected to be tightly linked to 
litigation, which was why background information with regards to legal cases were 
asked about. Experience with infringement claims were also asked about because 
they were assumed to be a usual start to licensing negotiations as well as a part of 
enforcement.  
To understand the managers’ firms’ roles in licensing discussions, the interviewees 
were asked whether their firm was actively targeting other firms or whether the firm 
had experience with being targeted by licensors. The information regarding how 
common it was for the firms to take part in litigation was to see how experienced 
their firms were with litigation as background information for questions regarding 
case strength. Also, factors limiting the way in which patents could be used where 
looked for by asking whether the firm had any external commitments affecting its 
patent use such as being part of standards that obligate licensing with fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. 
The background questions to the consultants were aimed at identifying which patent 
management activities their firms focused on and which general capability 
(technical, legal or business) from literature they themselves represented (in relation 
to findings from literature in chapter 2.2.3). The consultants were also asked about 
their general clientele to get an understanding of whether their answers might be 
steered towards particular industries, patent strategies or company sizes. 
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 THEMATIC QUESTIONS 
To find out what resources and general capabilities were at the different firms’ 
disposal, each interviewee was asked about internal resources (such as the number 
of employees in patent management functions, the level of specialisation of these 
individuals and whether the firm had a separate budget for patent litigation) as well 
as external resources in their firms’ and, in the consultants’ interviews, in their 
clients’ firms’ disposal (such as what is usually outsourced). It was assumed that the 
answers to these questions could be used as additional information for identifying 
which general patent strategies the firms pursued, to get a sense of the level of 
specialisation required by each activity in practice and to understand which 
resources and activities are required by a licensing-focused strategy and whether 
they should be invested in as internal resources or activities. 
The questions regarding case strength were built around the assumption that 
important factors impacting case strength had mostly to do with patent strength – 
the uncertainty with regards to patent scope and validity. However, to recognise also 
other factors that in practice could affect the expectations in licensing negotiations 
concerning litigation the interviewees were asked what other factors might affect a 
patent owner’s likelihood of winning a legal battle in court. Here, it was expected 
that litigation related resources and activities would be brought up. The remainder 
of the questions were built around what firms could with their own actions within 
individual negotiations and in anticipation to them (as part of the IP value chain) do 
to impact patent strength – to prove infringement and to enhance patent validity. In 
addition, detection of infringement was discussed as an activity as it seemed like a 
potentially important activity for patent management under a licensing-focused 
strategy for identifying potential licensees. 
General questions about what the license price is based on and how royalties are 
determined were asked to see whether the assumptions of the strategic valuation 
model (e.g. of the price being the result of a negotiation) made sense in practice. 
Valuation related resources were also asked about based on the assumption that 
economic reasoning and thus business capability could be needed for coming up 
with a convincing and profitable pricing model for licensing. 
The remainder of the questions were focused on bargaining power and the link 
between case strength and bargaining power. First, a broad question of what affects 
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the length of licensing negotiations was asked to get insights into factors impacting 
bargaining power but also to identify factors outside the strategic valuation model 
that ought to be considered or might be contradictory to the model. The assumption 
here was that quick negotiations would be at least partially explained by the patent 
owner’s high bargaining power relative to the licensee and therefore factors 
speeding negotiations could be potential factors for bargaining power. After this, the 
interviewees were asked about the impact the business context in which the 
negotiating firms operate in would have on bargaining power or the price of the 
license (such as business dealings in other functions of the firms) as well as direct 
questions about potential factors such as differences in firm size. Lastly, the 
interviewees were asked about the link between case strength and bargaining power 
to see how tight the link was in practice and whether in practice they could be seen 
as separate issues. 
3.3. ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the interview data was conducted following the inductive qualitative 
content analysis process described by Elo and Kyngäs (2007). The inductive 
approach was chosen to support the descriptive nature of the study and to help bridge 
the studied but fragmented area of research. The interview transcripts were first 
open-coded after which first of them were transferred to coding sheets in Microsoft 
Excel. Based on the first batch of interviews, the open-coded concepts were grouped 
into themes, factors and subfactors and then combined to an analysis sheet to which 
the latter interviews were included directly as the top-level themes were already 
identified. As the transcripts were in Finnish, the concepts had to be translated for 
analysis. The translation was done by myself at the point in which each interview 
was included in the analysis file. If there was a risk of losing the initial point the 
interviewee had made in the coding and translation process, the concept was written 
in a longer form than the concepts that could be condensed and translated without 
risk of misinterpretation during actual analysis. 
The analysis sheet was structured to depict the themes, factors, subfactors as well as 
examples or rationale from the interviews and to support quantification of the 
results. The basic structure of the analysis sheet is that each row depicts a particular 
viewpoint and the columns (7-19) depict separate interviews. The first column in 
the analysis sheet included the main topics covered in the interviews most of which 
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came directly from the interview guide (examples of topics include validity and 
bargaining power). The second column included the themes (such as factors 
impacting patent validity) and the third and fourth column included the factors and 
subfactors impacting or describing a particular theme. The fifth column included 
additional information and was used to help with remembering specific points or 
interesting rationales provided by interviewees referring to specific factors in the 
analysis sheet. Each theme, factor, subfactor and additional bit of information was 
written on separate rows so that mentions to each could be summed on the analysis 
sheet in column 6. A mention of a subfactor was included in the sum of the subfactor, 
its top-level factor as well as the theme it linked to. As some of the interviewees 
mentioned only top-level factors, the sum for top-level factors with particular 
themes could be higher than the sums for the subfactors within the themes. 
Table 4 depicts the stylised summary table of the qualitative content analysis for 
theme factors impacting patent validity. The table includes information on factors 
identified from the interview transcripts, their subfactors if the top-level factors 
where summarising multiple factors as well as the information of how many 
interviewees discussed the factor and from which perspective. In the example, 
almost all interviewees have brought some insight to factors impacting patent 
validity and for instance 9 out of 13 have discussed patent scope in this context. We 
can also notice that the column for consultant C4 is empty due to the fact that the 
interviewee wished not to comment on the topic as it was not in the interviewee’s 
area of expertise. The table quickly shows what was generally discussed around 
each issue and showcases which analysis sheet or transcript to return to for more 
specific information. 
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Table 4: Example of analysis on factors impacting patent validity 
 
The calculation of mentions was used to check for whether there were enough 
interviews to reach saturation as well as for finding the factors that were most 
prominent based on the interviews. The number of mentions was not used to rank 
viewpoints. For example, if one factor got three mentions and another got four, both 
factors were included in the analysis as significant viewpoints. What is noteworthy, 
is how in line the points mentioned by the different interviewees were. As the points 
made by at least two interviewees weren’t contradictory, and even the points made 
by only individual interviewees were mostly giving additional information, the 
interviews could be analysed in a rather straightforward manner. In the findings 
section therefore, when numbers of people who discussed a topic are marked in the 
text, this doesn’t suggest that others disagreed with the point that was made. It 
simply means that they didn’t directly discuss it. 
A limitation to the analysis process is that the coding was conducted and validated 
by a single person so the dialogue on how the categories should be formed, which 
is recommended by Elo and Kyngäs (2008), was not a part of the process. However, 
for future research purposes, the analysis sheets have been created so that other 
researchers with access to the interview transcripts could check whether they agree 
with the interpretations made. To mitigate over-interpretation, the concepts and 
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categories were formed following a cautionary approach: a point in the transcript 
was more likely left out of the final analysis sheet if it was unclear how it should be 
interpreted. 
3.4. ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To answer the research questions of the thesis, a framework linking the different 
theoretical factors contributing to license price to different patent management 
activity domains was formed based on literature. The findings from the interviews 
were than used to fill in the framework in the two different contexts of analysis: 
based on findings regarding a single patent licensing negotiation and based on 
findings regarding patent management activities and resources impacting value 
appropriation in licensing negotiations in general. The framework used for 
answering the research questions is presented in figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: A framework for linking factors contributing to license price to 
patent management activity domains based on findings from interviews 
In answering the research questions, the starting point for the analysis were the 
factors determining the columns of the framework (figure 8) which are the same as 
the parameters in the strategic valuation model (described in chapter 2.3.2). The 
factors were taken as given and served as the basis for the interviews, which 
described which factors impact the license price factors and how the identified 
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factors can be impacted. Based on these findings as well as on answers by the 
interviewees concerning different patent management activities and resources, 
activities and resources contributing to the license price factors were identified and 
mapped to the three patent management activity domains of rights, enforcement and 
licensing from theory.   
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4. FINDINGS 
Chapters 4.1 and 4.2 focus on findings concerning value appropriation through 
patent licensing and, together with the theoretical framework presented in chapter 
3.4, are used to answer the research questions of the thesis. Chapter 4.1 focuses on 
the findings that relate to the factors contributing to license price depicted by the 
strategic valuation model in chapter 2.3.2. Chapter 4.2 then elaborates on and 
summarises these by describing findings and conclusions on how the factors 
presented in chapter 4.1 link to different aspects of patent management from a 
managerial standpoint. 
4.1. FINDINGS ON FACTORS IMPACTING LICENSE PRICE 
Based on the interviews, the factors contributing to the patent owner’s appropriated 
value from licensing negotiations can be affected within the short-term context of a 
single licensing negotiation and in the long-term context by different patent 
management activities throughout the IP value chain. Findings on the different 
factors depicted by the strategic valuation model (chapter 2.3.2) are discussed in 
chapters 4.1.1-4.1.4. Chapter 4.1.5 describes general findings on what the license 
price in pure patent licensing is based on and how the factors are linked to this. 
 CASE STRENGTH 
In the interviews, case strength was discussed mostly from two main perspectives, 
patent infringement and patent validity, as these are the aspects needed to be able to 
enforce one’s right in court and have to do with the patent document. These are also 
the viewpoints arising from literature relating to uncertainty of patent scope and 
validity. In addition, also other factors affecting case strength were discussed. These 
were factors not relating to the patent document that could affect a case if it went to 
court and which could also affect the licensing negotiation through expectations or 
in the case the negotiation would occur alongside ongoing litigation.  
Patent infringement related questions where divided to detection of infringement 
and proving infringement as they are separate actions. In this chapter, the focus is 
on proving infringement as it is an enforcement activity impacting interpretations of 
the scope of the patent. Findings on detecting infringement are discussed in chapter 
4.2.1. 
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For the patent to be enforceable against an infringer, its scope needs to cover the 
implementation of the technology under dispute in the infringer’s products or 
processes and the infringement needs to be proven in court. Thus, to prove 
infringement, the patent owner needs to show two things: that the disputed 
technology is actually implemented in the product or process of the potential 
infringer (3/13) and that the patent covers the technology under dispute (4/13). As 
two interviewees mentioned, even if the product claims to implement a standard the 
patent is part of, there still needs to be evidence of the fact that the technology 
covered by the particular patent is implemented in the product. 
Proving infringement requires resources as it involves gathering evidence by testing 
the product internally or externally and legal costs and use of experts if it is done by 
litigating4F5. The difficulty of proving infringement depends on each case and can 
have an impact on the costs of proving infringement5F6. The different factors 
impacting the difficulty to prove infringement are depicted in figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Factors impacting difficulty of proving infringement 
The clearer the description of the technology in the patent document is, the easier 
the technology is to identify in the final product and the easier it is to examine the 
                                                     
5 In cases where finding enough evidence to prove infringement is very difficult, the 
litigation process can also be used to gain more information about the disputed technology 
(7/13). In the US for instance, a pre-trial procedure called discovery can be used to gain more 
evidence which can be than used to boost the licensing negotiation further. 
6 According to the interviewees, proving infringement is usually more difficult than detecting 
it. A likely infringement may be easily detectable but being able to prove it in court can still 
be difficult or at least laboursome. For instance, a product may be compatible with a standard 
and showcase this in its packaging, but whether it implements a particular patented technical 
feature that is part of the standard needs to be shown separately. 
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implementation, the easier the infringement should be to prove. Another alleviating 
factor are standards, as their implementation in products or processes includes also 
the implementation of standard essential patents (SEPs). However, as one 
interviewee pointed out, not all patents that are claimed to be essential to a standard 
are truly essential to it6F7. Thus, this factor is likely to help most in cases where the 
essentiality of the patent to the standard has been tested in earlier cases and the 
patent has been found “truly essential” by a court. 
In case the patent owner owns several patents likely infringed upon by potential 
licensees, the four factors in figure 9 can be used for selecting patents for licensing 
discussions. From a broader perspective however, the factors themselves can be 
impacted themselves by decisions on what types of patents the firm holds and how 
each patent is originally drafted. Therefore, the uncertainty with regards to patent 
scope can be affected also in the patenting and portfolio management activities – 
not just by the decisions as part of licensing. 
For a patent to be strong in licensing and litigation, it needs to be both infringed and 
valid. In the interviews, the ways in which a patent owner can impact patent 
validity were discussed from two perspectives: how to pick the strongest patents 
from an existing portfolio (7/13) and what makes a patent strong in the first place 
(12/13). The first perspective focuses more on the “now” and is part of the decision-
making in the licensing process whereas the second perspective takes a look back at 
earlier stages in the patent value chain and focuses on the decisions made in the 
patenting and portfolio management phases. The second perspective works as the 
basis for the first as it highlights the factors decision-makers should consider when 
picking patents for licensing. Factors impacting patent validity are summarised in 
figure 10. 
                                                     
7 Essentiality of claimed SEPs is studied for instance by Stitzing et al. (2017) in the cellular 
industry. The study finds indicators of essentiality such as citations to and from other SEPs 
as well as declarations against technical documents which could be useful for firms trying 
to identify truly essential patents from their own or other’s portfolio. 
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Figure 10: Factors impacting patent validity 
The three first factors from the left (patent scope, backup steps in patent document 
and precision throughout patenting process in figure 10) have to do with work by 
the patent attorney in drafting the patent and of the actions of the company in the 
patenting process. By writing a “clear and concise” document, as one consultant 
described it, the patent attorney can limit the window for potential prior art that 
could be found and which might invalidate the patent. On the other, by writing the 
document so that it can be reduced and narrowed afterwards and still cover the 
technology it is meant to protect, the patent attorney can increase the likelihood of 
the patent to remain valid.  
Several interviewees highlighted the importance of precision throughout the 
patenting process that concerns both the work of the patent attorney as well as the 
company. Mistakes in the patent document (such as missing names of inventors) 
and in the patenting process (such as making information about the innovation 
public too early or being inconsistent in the communication with the patenting 
office) can be used afterwards for patent invalidation. Due to the importance of 
getting things right the first time and not dropping the ball during the lifetime of the 
patent (by e.g. forgetting to pay patent maintenance fees to the patent office), some 
interviewees wanted to highlight the importance of using experienced patenting 
professionals in the patenting process (4/13). 
The fourth factor impacting patent validity (figure 10), phase in patenting process, 
has to do with mitigating uncertainty by looking at indications of validity from 
patent grants and opposition throughout the patent family. The rationale of this 
indicator is that the more patent examination processes the patent family passes, the 
more likely the patent is to remain valid also in the future. Also, passed opposition 
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processes can be used as indicators of validity as well as indicators of potential value 
as opposition could indicate which patents are seen by other parties as threats. 
In picking patents for licensing, some companies put in extensive resources to look 
for weaknesses in their patents themselves (2/13) to identify the patents most likely 
to remain valid and also to prepare themselves for the discussions in the licensing 
process. Firms for instance looked at which patents had been tested in court 
previously and remained valid to identify valuable and strong patents for licensing 
(2/13). According to one manager, companies should as part of this analysis also 
consider the strength of the opponents in the prior cases as this may have impacted 
the strength of the test the patents went through. The rationale is that the stronger 
the previous opponents trying to invalidate the patent have been, the more likely the 
patent is to remain valid in the future as well. 
In addition to patent scope and validity, other factors not directly stemming from 
patent law were discussed. Here, topics such as litigation strategy, ability to 
convince judges, having the best people working for one’s team and thorough 
preparation where brought up by the interviewees. Through the resource and 
capability positions of the firms negotiating, these factors are assumed to be part of 
issues impacting bargaining power (findings in chapter 4.1.2) in the framework and 
have to do with the link between enforcement and licensing (discussed more in 
chapter 4.2.1).  
The overall uncertainty concerning case strength was mitigated by the licensing 
firms by including several patents or patent portfolios in licensing deals as opposed 
to licensing individual patents. This way, although the risk with an individual patent 
might be substantial, the uncertainty for the set of patents could remain reasonably 
low as the likelihood of all the patents in the case to be found invalid and non-
infringing would be much lower than for individual patents. This once again 
emphasises the resource-intensiveness of licensing as it is not necessarily enough to 
have individual patents relevant to a patent implementor but to have multiple patents 
relevant to the implementor. 
 BARGAINING POWER 
Based on the interviews, bargaining power is a case specific factor and relative to 
the other party in the negotiation. Factors impacting how bargaining power is 
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divided among two negotiating parties is summarised in figure 11. The theoretic 
factors are separate from that affecting case strength although some of them are 
closely linked to it. For instance, “what is being negotiated”, a subfactor of the 
resource position of a firm, concerns the patents that are in the negotiation and their 
importance to the patent owner and to the patent implementor but can be also 
interpreted to cover case strength related issues. 
 
Figure 11: Factors impacting the bargaining power of the negotiating parties 
On top of having to do with the importance of the assets being negotiated, resource 
position includes also the monetary ability of each party to bear risk of the case 
going to court. Litigation is expensive and uncertain and can take place in multiple 
jurisdictions at the same time. The firm that is more able to bear this risk, is likely 
to have more bargaining power in this regard. 
The link to rest of business was discussed from multiple perspectives by the 
interviewees. First, the extent to which the patent implementor’s business is exposed 
by the patent will have an impact on the negotiation (the more, the higher the 
bargaining power of the patent licensor). The importance of the negotiation as a 
reference on the other hand can be a reducing factor in terms of the licensor’s 
bargaining power: especially in the case of a small licensor with no previous 
licensing deals, to get a deal to signal willingness to pay for other potential licensees, 
it may be willing to offer a lower price to the first licensee. 
The relationship the licensor and the patent implementor have in other business 
areas can have an impact on the negotiated deal. As one manager wanted to 
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highlight, this doesn’t necessarily mean that a license will be cheap to existing 
partners. It just means that the negotiation will also have to consider the overall 
business impact of the licensing negotiation among the negotiating parties. 
According to one interviewee, the internal valuation of a patent license can be 
performed using a Best Alternative to Negotiated Deal (BATNA) analysis, which is 
basically what factor three, alternatives to taking the license, deals with. Here the 
general idea is that the more opportunities the firm has to reach its business goals 
without the license, the better its bargaining position in the negotiation is. As the 
alternatives can often be given a monetary estimate, they can be used as limits to 
how much the firm will be willing to pay for a license. Alternatives differ by case 
but include going to court instead of negotiating, using an alternative technology or 
inventing around the patent and buying the patent or the entire business of the 
licensor. The cost of finding technological alternatives depends on time and effort 
needed to come up with an alternative solution and the level of the technology in 
question: the more basic the technology is, the more difficult it is to find alternatives 
to it and the more bargaining power the patent owner is likely to have. Based on the 
interviews, the other alternatives are likely to be linked to company size as resource 
position can be expected to explain ability to litigate and make acquisitions. 
According to one manager, some big players are especially aggressive: instead of 
taking part in friendly licensing negotiations, they wait for the cases to be taken to 
court and then make the “war so big that very few firms […] have the means to bear 
the costs [of litigation]”. This way, the firms deter also other licensing firms from 
approaching them in the future. 
Knowledge position was referred to by the interviewees as the understanding of the 
negotiating parties of the licensing environment. This included tacit information 
about details of completed license deals in relevant industries as well as experience 
with licensing negotiations, knowing when to push a deal and on the other hand 
when to accept an offer. The party with the more experience could have more power 
due to the other side not having the same information and thus making decisions 
with a worse understanding of the context of the negotiation. With this point, the 
interviewees wished to highlight the importance of finding the right, experienced 
people to the licensing team. This however can be more easily said than done as one 
consultant mentioned that assessing the quality of the advice received can be very 
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difficult – especially for those companies with little experience in licensing 
beforehand. 
Business circumstances were discussed by the interviewees as explanatory factors 
for both sides to try to reach agreement. In general, having cases open or closed 
affects companies differently in different circumstances. For instance, a firm about 
to make an initial public offering (IPO) may be risk averse and thus willing to accept 
license offers faster than a firm with little to lose. As one consultant described it: 
“Rate of growth can have an effect, […] if you’re business is growing rapidly, you 
can have greater pressure. Conversely, if you’re doing poorly, then you maybe have 
less pressure to take a license.” Also, licensors looking for investors may be willing 
to keep cases open as then “there’s still [value] potential”, as one interviewee put it, 
as opposed to get valuations for their assets. All in all, this factor highlights the 
importance of understanding the business thinking behind the other side’s decision 
making. 
The five factors are closely linked and not necessarily mutually exclusive. For 
instance, the importance of the technology being negotiated has to do with its link 
to the business of each party and alternatives to using other technologies. Based on 
the different factors discussed by the interviewees, bargaining power could be 
summarised as the need of each party relative to the need of the other party to reach 
agreement in the negotiation. As an example, the more critical the license is to the 
business of the patent implementor, the worse its negotiating position, unless the 
licensor has significant deficiencies on its own side (for instance, inability to take 
the case to court). 
The five factors are impacted by the licensor’s decisions of which firms it chooses 
to approach in licensing negotiations as bargaining power is always relative to its 
opponent. In the long-term, the licensor can also impact its perceived bargaining 
power by for instance indicating ability to take cases to court. According to one 
consultant, you cannot take all your cases to court, but, as one manager described it, 
“if you have enough of these benchmarks [of having enforced your patents in court], 
then the threat of litigation is sufficient”. By being credible in this regard, the 
licensor can mitigate its future risk of litigation and increase its likelihood of 
reaching license deals by purely negotiating. According to one manager, in some 
cases contracts between partners may be such that a large player takes care of 
enforcing a smaller player’s rights. Thus, in the long-term, the licensor can also 
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impact its resource and knowledge position by teaming up with a better-resourced 
and more experienced player. 
 COST OF LITIGATION 
Although the costs of litigation weren’t in focus in the interview guide, they were 
discussed in several interviews. Overall, the costs of litigation were discussed as a 
significant cost to conducting licensing and a required cost to conducting pure patent 
licensing. As discussed in the previous chapter, although not every licensing case 
needs to be taken to court, according to the interviewees, some cases have to be in 
order to generate demand for the licenses covering only the use of the patented 
technology.  
In practice, the costs of litigation depend on several factors. First of all, the costs 
(and who pays for what) differ by country. For example, based on the interviews, it 
is significantly more expensive to take part in litigation in the US than for instance 
in Finland. In addition, the costs differ depending on in how many markets the firms 
litigate. Although according to one consultant the smallest domestic cases may be 
resolved with tens of thousands of euros in legal fees, the largest cases involving 
several jurisdictions are in the millions. According to one manager, the costs of 
litigation include also the costs of preparation before taking part in any legal 
proceedings. In duration, the preparation was described by the manager to 
sometimes take as much time as the actual litigation. Despite the importance of 
preparation was emphasised by all the interviewees who discussed it, how much 
firms decide and need to invest in it and how much this preparation can be used for 
other cases the firm is part of is likely to differ. 
For patent implementing small firms, the costs of litigation can also include the time 
involved in the litigation process that is away from focusing on the firms’ core work 
such as product development or sales. According to one consultant, long 
negotiations attached to litigation can be detrimental to these firms in cases in which 
they in fact do not implement the patents under dispute. Even if they eventually are 
found not to be infringing the patents and are given freedom to operate, the time and 
resources put in fighting may still kill the firm. In the strategic valuation model, this 
issue is reflected by the resource position of the firm affecting bargaining power 
although in practice it can be thought of as part of the indirect costs of litigating. 
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From the patent licensing perspective, one manager wished to highlight, that 
although litigation costs are significant, licensing negotiations including litigation 
are “the tip of the iceberg”. In most cases, legal actions don’t need to be taken and 
based on the other interviews, even when legal actions are taken, the parties usually 
come up with an agreement before reaching trial or before the legal battle would be 
completed. 
 DISCOUNTED CASH-FLOW FROM ASSET 
The discounted cash-flow from asset was not focused on in the interviews as it is an 
exogenous factor from the patent owner’s perspective. However, the interviewees 
did discuss how it could be affected by the patent owner. When discussing patent 
picking for licensing, the interviewees mentioned considerations of both validity 
and infringement as well as business considerations. On top of picking patents that 
are likely to remain valid and cover the technological implementation, firms should 
choose patents that cover technologies that are actually used in products or processes 
and generating revenue in the market (2/13). Based on the interviews, licensing is a 
highly resource-intensive activity, often involving litigation, so it should be done 
with patents that bring value and generate returns to those implementing them to 
have potential to generate revenue to the licensor. In this regard, licensors should 
also target firms that are able to implement their patented technologies profitably.  
To summarise, although the patent owner is not able to affect the commercialising 
decisions of the patent implementor, it may pick patents and licensing targets to a 
single negotiation or develop its licensing program and portfolio as part of its patent 
management activities by considering the commercial value of the patent 
implementations. Although commitments such as FRAND with SEPs may limit the 
patent owner’s ability to pick whom to target for these patents (so it won’t 
discriminate any potential licensee), the firm still can make decisions over which 
negotiations it invests most in to reach agreements. 
 PRICE OF LICENSE  
When discussing what the price in pure patent licensing stands for, interviewees 
discussed it as the payment for neutralising the threat of being taken to court for 
using the technology covered by the patent (3/13) – in other words, the perceived 
value of avoiding litigation. Also, as the factors case strength, bargaining power and 
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cost of litigation are, based on the interviews, very closely linked, they could be 
combined to form the threat of litigation, which would include all the aspects 
concerning the patent, bargaining positions of the players and the associated costs 
of litigation and would together explain the license price based on the negotiation 
whereas the discounted cash-flow from asset would remain to stand for 
implementation. 
In the interviews, the impacting factors for reaching agreements on the license price 
were also summarised. To reach agreement and come up with a license deal, the 
patent implementor needs to be convinced of its need for the license (6/13), the price 
of the license (2/13) and of the patent owner as a partner (2/13). To be convinced of 
the need for the license, the patent implementor needs to be convinced that there is 
a considerable threat of litigation (5/13) and of its own business need for the 
technology the license covers (3/13). To accept the price of the license, the 
implementor needs to be convinced that the price is reasonable from the perspective 
of its own business (2/13) and it can help if there are reference prices from previous 
deals to show that there are also others who have paid this much (2/13) or more. 
Finally, the implementor needs to be convinced of the patent owner as a trustworthy 
partner. As one interviewee mentioned, this can be especially difficult with tough 
rivals. Most of these factors link to specific factors depicted by the strategic 
valuation model and to specific factors discussed already in chapters 4.1.1-4.1.4. 
However, the softer and more human issues of trust and being able to work with 
people from different cultural backgrounds are not necessarily depicted by the 
model directly. As these factors were highlighted by many of the interviewees 
(5/13), they are likely to be important in practice and are discussed more in chapter 
4.2.2 when resources and capabilities needed for licensing are discussed.   
4.2. FINDINGS ON PATENT MANAGEMENT FROM 
LICENSING PERSPECTIVE 
Based on the interviews, different resources, capabilities and patent management 
activities can be identified that support licensing in the context of individual 
licensing negotiations as well as throughout patent management. Findings on 
resources, capabilities and activities from a patent licensing perspective are 
described in chapters 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. Chapter 4.2.3 focuses on findings on patent 
licensing in practice which cover broader notions of patent licensing than the one-
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sided pure patent licensing, which is in focus in the theoretical framework used for 
answering the research questions of the thesis.  
 RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES 
Based on specific answers regarding the required resources to succeed in licensing 
and on conclusions made from findings summarised in chapter 4.1., resources and 
competencies needed to succeed in patent licensing negotiations are summarised in 
figure 12 with examples. Other than monetary resources, the different competence 
areas link to the different human resources and types of capabilities needed to 
succeed. 
 
Figure 12: Resources and competencies needed for licensing negotiations 
The different factors cover the technological, legal and business capabilities that 
rose from literature (chapter 2.2.3). Based on the interviews, all of these capabilities 
should be represented for a patent owner to succeed in distinct licensing 
negotiations. The lack of technological competence was for instance seen as a 
specific weakness of some licensing firms. According to one manager, “patenting is 
in the end all about understanding the technical environment”. Creating claim charts 
and convincing the patent implementor that they in fact use the patent and that this 
could be proven requires technological competence. Legal competence is required 
from many aspects including contractual issues and litigation. Also, this competence 
was characterised as market-specific as rules, regulations and thus the patent 
owner’s ability to enforce its rights may differ by market. Business competence was 
seen as an important factor for reaching deals as, on top of referring to benchmarks 
of what others have paid earlier for similar licenses, targeted arguments based on 
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the specific business circumstances of the patent implementor were seen as 
important by the interviewees. 
On top of the monetary resources and the technological, legal and business 
competencies, three interviewees with backgrounds focused on licensing wished to 
highlight people skills as one competence area. This includes factors such as 
building trust, which was seen by one manager as important similarly to as part of 
any sales work: “the [negotiators on the other side] need to convince the leadership 
of their own firm that if they make this [license deal] they aren’t make a huge 
mistake. […] You need to build a level of trust that the opponent believes that they 
aren’t being fooled.” In addition, different cultures play a role in how specific 
negotiations play out as does the relationships between the people negotiating. 
According to one consultant, in some cases negotiations can be advanced by 
changing people in the team. 
Although the factors described in figure 12 refer to the specific context of licensing 
negotiations they can be applied more broadly to patent management. Technological 
and legal competencies are required by the patenting, portfolio management and 
enforcement activities. Business competence could be seen as needed for 
developing the patent management from the licensing perspective and that way to 
portfolio management and determining the business cases of whom to approach with 
license offers. In addition to the factors mentioned, several interviewees mentioned 
the invention as an important starting point - of holding a patent to a commercially 
significant technology. 
 ACTIVITIES AND OUTSOURCING 
Based on the interviews, activities from across the patent management capability 
and from the two major activity domains (rights and enforcement, as referred to in 
chapter 2.2.3) can be identified to support or be part of licensing. In this chapter 
findings on these activities as well as their role in value creation and appropriation 
is summarised and the topic of activity outsourcing in patent management context 
is discussed. 
Both patenting and portfolio management (the activities forming the rights 
activity domain) were discussed in the interviews as important activities for setting 
up the patent use potential to the patent owner. The decisions made in these activities 
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as well as the quality of work conducted throughout the patenting process were 
described to impact directly the quality of the patents and therefore the threat of 
litigation through case strength as well as the strategic alternatives of the patent 
owner. An example of this was given by one consultant as the possibility to split 
markets by licensing to specific geographical locations or to specific use cases. 
Although in prior literature these activities have been referred to as value 
appropriating (Reitzig and Puranam 2009), from a licensing perspective they can be 
regarded as value creating as the decisions of what to include in the patent document 
and to which markets to file for a patent and create translations are points at which 
value potential are created. However, these activities can be seen also as potentially 
value diminishing as some of them, such as paying maintenance fees, are routine 
activities but if done incorrectly, destroy the value of the patent asset. 
Enforcement was seen as a key activity domain for patent licensing. The 
enforcement activities that were discussed linked to patent licensing are litigation 
and detecting infringement. Based on the interviews, the former generates demand 
for the patent licenses whereas the latter is about identifying demand in the market. 
In terms of value creation and appropriation, both can be categorised as value 
creating activities from a licensing perspective. 
Litigation was seen as a key activity for patent licensing. As described in chapter 
4.1.5, the price of a pure patent license was described by the interviewees as the 
price for minimising the threat of litigation. In addition, the licensing negotiation in 
big cases was described to occur often alongside an ongoing legal process. In the 
examples given by the interviewees, it was often the different phases in the legal 
process that sped up or muffled ongoing licensing negotiations as the litigation fed 
more information to the parties in the negotiation or the start of a legal process 
demonstrated the willingness of the patent owner to enforce its rights and thus made 
the threat of litigation more credible to the patent implementor. Although not 
necessary for every license deal negotiated, litigation as an activity seems to be a 
requirement for licensing-focused patent management based on the interviews. 
Companies had different routes to detecting infringement that were linked to the 
market they operated in. Companies in the process industry or in industries where 
the patented technology was implemented in heavy machinery or as part of a process 
within a plant trained their sales staff who travel a lot and visit customers’ sites to 
know how to look for potential infringements. Other companies, whose technologies 
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are implemented in B2C products, could look for information from company 
websites, purchase devices made by their competitors or as one interviewee put it, 
sometimes watch as people online pulled the products to pieces on videos. Different 
approaches to detecting infringement are summarised in figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: Different approaches to detecting potential patent infringement 
Companies approach to looking for potential infringements differed: one of the 
managers of the licensing-focused firms described the process as portfolio-based 
(going through the portfolio to find patents likely to be infringed by firms in the 
market and then looking for patent implementing firms) whereas other managers 
discussed a more reactive approach focusing on teaching people outside the patent 
management capability to identify potential infringements. The answers suggest that 
licensing-focused firms could be more proactive in looking for potential 
infringements compared to firms following different patent strategies. However, 
whether these approaches can be identified more broadly when comparing firms 
conducting different patent strategies should be studied further to draw conclusions. 
Based on the interviews, patent use related activities (excluding commercialisation) 
include activities such as preparing for and conducting negotiations and strategy 
work (which could also be referred to as business development). Of these activities, 
strategy work can be seen as value creating whereas the activities that are part of the 
licensing negotiations can be seen as value appropriating. In addition to these 
activities, the interviewees discussed also compliance and contract management, 
which are activities conducted after reaching license deals to ensure that the 
licensees act according to what was agreed upon. For the licensing firm, they are 
then again also value appropriating activities, just focusing on a latter phase in the 
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licensing process then has been discussed thus far: making sure that the price that 
was agreed upon gets paid by the licensee.  
The outsourcing of different patent management activities was also discussed in the 
interviews. According to the interviewees, companies that patent or conduct patent 
licensing usually utilise external capabilities in at least some of their patent 
management activities, and in the case of small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs), the interviews indicate that in most. Based on the interviews, activities that 
are often outsourced include patenting and litigation whereas coordination of the 
different patent management activities are usually conducted internally. When asked 
about activities that would be especially difficult to outsource, the interviewees 
described work involving strategic decisions concerning the firm’s portfolio. As one 
consultant described it, most work can be done by someone external to the company 
but decision-making is difficult to outsource. Factors impacting the decisions of 
firms to outsource are summarised in figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Factors impacting outsourcing decisions 
Based on the interviews, requirements, expertise and workload should be considered 
when making decisions about outsourcing. If certain expertise is required 
temporarily but not possessed internally, it needs to be acquired from external 
sources. Also, hiring internal experts may not make sense if there isn’t enough work 
for professional development as the expertise may not continue to evolve and may 
even diminish with lack of practice, which was the rationale described by a manager 
of one of the firms. Based on these factors, many of the patent owning firms 
represented in the interviews had chosen a model in which most of their patent-
related activities were conducted by external service providers. Only the firm with 
the largest portfolio had a number of employees working with patent-related matters 
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that could cover most of the patent-related activities, yet even this company 
outsourced specific tasks continuously. 
 DIFFERENT FORMS OF PATENT LICENSING 
Although the focus in the strategic valuation model (described in chapter 2.3.2) is 
on one-sided pure patent licensing, it is noteworthy that in the interviews much of 
the conversations around practical cases revolved around either wider agreements 
(e.g. agreements including patent sales or paying for products or technological 
know-how) or cross-licensing. As one manager explained: “that type of licensing 
business, in which we make money by selling licenses, we do a little but [that part 
of the business] is very small.” Also, when discussing pure patent licensing, patent 
sales were mentioned by one interviewee to be sometimes used in deals to mix 
things so that the deal wouldn’t be so useful for future parties trying to use the deal 
as a benchmark. Based on the interviews, in practice pure patent licensing, unless as 
conducted in its two-sided form of cross-licensing, is likely not the norm but the 
exception in patent licensing. It is either not done or it is muddled so as to avoid 
being too transparent to other players in the market. 
When the licensing negotiation included also other things such as sales of patents or 
wider technology agreements (4/13), what the license price stood for were 
somewhat muddled and could be argued to stand for something else than simply 
neutralising the threat of litigation (e.g. for paying for a product or service). 
According to one of the managers, in case of negotiating a business-to-business 
product sale, the sale of patent licenses come often baked into the sale. Based on the 
interview, this makes patent value appropriation easier for the patent owner for two 
reasons: as the sale of a license is attached to something more concrete, a product, 
it can be easier to convince the customer to pay and as the sale is in the firm’s case 
based on an upfront payment instead of e.g. sales unit based royalties, it doesn’t 
have to consider compliance activities to make sure the royalties received match the 
royalties that should be received based on actual sales of the licensee.  
In the interviews, different reasons for why manufacturers might be interested in 
licensing were discussed. These reasons included industry characteristics and new 
technology launches. For example, in industries in which transportation is difficult 
and multiple plants in different geographical location are required to serve the 
market (such as the glass industry discussed by manager M5), it can make sense to 
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license the technology to other markets and profit from them without having to make 
the investments to expand production. According to one manager, in this type of 
industry it can be also easier to conduct licensing in general as the different market 
players are used to the idea of licensing (whereas in industries without this operating 
logic the first responses to licensing efforts might be more hostile). Another reason 
to license a technology would be to help spread a new technology to the market 
(2/13). This could be to have more firms’ marketing efforts in educating the market 
to switch to a new product type (as mentioned by one consultant) or if getting the 
product to market would require many players in the first place as could be with 
technologies requiring interoperability.  
Overall, licensing in the interviews was discussed as a targeted effort deeply linked 
to the strategic goals of the firm. When not used as the means for generating income, 
it can be used to boost other objectives of the firm. As one manager described it, “it 
is all about getting things moving forward, getting our products to sell, getting this 
concept built and the licenses are in a way included in reaching the goal we have”.  
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5. DISCUSSION 
5.1. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To answer the research problem, “What activities and resources should a patent 
owning firm invest in to appropriate value from its patents in licensing 
negotiations?”, two research questions were formulated focusing on activities and 
resources contributing to value appropriation in the context of a single licensing 
negotiation and in the long-term context of patent management. In this chapter 
answers to the research questions based on theoretical and empirical analysis are 
demonstrated. 
The first research question was: “What activities and resources contribute to the 
patent owner’s appropriated value in a single licensing negotiation?” As an 
answer to the first part of the question, a table depicting the different patent 
management activities contributing to the patent owner’s appropriated value is 
presented (table 5). The table is based on the theoretic framework for answering the 
research questions, which was represented in chapter 3.4., and depicts the activities 
affecting the factors contributing to license price that were identified from 
interviews. 
Table 5: Activities contributing to the patent owner’s appropriated value in a 
single licensing negotiation 
 
Based on the licensing context summarised by the strategic valuation model and 
interviews, the main activity domains contributing to value appropriation in the 
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context of a single licensing negotiation are licensing and enforcement, licensing 
being the main activity domain and enforcement the supportive one. Specific 
contributing licensing activities include choosing patents, negotiation and strategy 
work. The decisions of which patents are chosen to the negotiation contribute to 
license price in the framework in three ways: Firstly, patent picking is the main way 
to affect case strength in the negotiation as by identifying strengths and weaknesses 
in the patents and by picking several patents (instead of picking one) the patent 
owner can mitigate uncertainty relating to patent scope and validity. By choosing 
patents that cover commercially significant technologies to the potential licensee, 
the patent owner can also impact the discounted cash-flow from asset in question in 
the negotiation as well as its own bargaining power relative to the licensee. In 
licensing negotiations, the main strategy work has to do with picking the potential 
licensee with which to take part in the negotiation. This decision affects the 
bargaining powers of the players as they are relative to who is on the other side as 
well as to the discounted cash-flow from asset as this is based on the actions of the 
licensee. In addition, choosing the licensee can have an impact on the expected costs 
of litigation as there are differences in how extensive legal battles firms are willing 
to participate in based on the interviews. 
Specific contributing enforcement activities include proving infringement and 
litigation, which can be also used to help in proving infringement. Proving 
infringement as an activity is required for communicating to the potential licensee 
its need to get the license based on the scope of the patent and how it is implemented 
in the licensee’s products or processes. Litigation as an activity on the other hand 
can be used to boost ongoing negotiations with an unwilling licensee by adding 
pressure to the negotiation and demonstrating litigation threat. The patent owner’s 
own litigation strategy is also likely to impact the costs of litigation in the framework 
at least through the steps that are demonstrated to the other side (in the sense that, if 
an agreement cannot be reached, the patent owner has indicated taking the case to 
court somewhere). 
The activities discussed involve specific resources such as specialised experts in the 
form of patent attorneys, lawyers and negotiators as well as the patent portfolio of 
the patent owning firm and the monetary assets and human resources affecting the 
possibility to take the case to court. Patent attorneys are used for example for 
technical aspects of licensing negotiations and for proving infringement as part of 
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enforcement, lawyers for contractual issues in the negotiations and for litigation and 
negotiators for the licensing discussions with the potential licensee. The patent 
portfolio of the firm limits the firm’s possibilities of choosing patents for licensing 
whereas its resource position in terms of resources that can be channeled to litigation 
limit its bargaining power. 
The second research question was: “What activities and resources contribute to 
the patent owner’s appropriated value throughout patent management?” 
Similarly to answering the first research question, contributing activities are 
represented in table 6. 
Table 6: Activities contributing to the patent owner’s appropriated value 
throughout patent management 
 
From the long-term patent management standpoint, the patent owner’s appropriated 
value in the licensing negotiation is impacted by work prior to the negotiation in the 
three patent management activity domains of rights, enforcement and licensing. 
Although rights related activities didn’t play a significant role in the individual 
negotiation context, they are essential early factors when considering the IP value 
chain. The two main activities here, patenting and portfolio management impact the 
opportunity horizon of the licensing-focused patent owner by defining what the 
patents are that the firm has to conduct licensing with both in terms patent strength 
and commercial significance. The activities have implications for all the factors 
contributing to license price in the strategic valuation model as can be seen from 
table 6. Even cost of litigation is indirectly impacted by the decisions made in the 
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patenting activity as they impact the difficulty to prove infringement in court and 
how large a legal battle is possible based on the size of the patent family. 
From the value appropriation perspective in patent licensing context, the patent 
enforcement activities of litigation and detecting infringement play significant roles 
in generating and identifying demand for patent licenses. By taking cases to court, 
the patent owner signals to potential licensees that the threat of litigation is real and 
that there are credible reasons to pay for the patent license. Court decisions on 
specific patents can be also used as evidence of case strength and the stronger the 
previous opponents have been, the stronger the indication of strength can be thought 
to be based on the interviews. Detecting infringement on the other hand consists of 
identifying potential licensees for licensing negotiations based on implementations 
of the patented technology or based on identified needs of firms to start 
implementing the patented technology. 
Based on the interviews, licensing needs to be seen as a continuum in which work 
in the licensing activities (negotiation and strategy work) in earlier licensing 
negotiations contribute to future negotiations as well. The results from negotiations 
are benchmarks both for future licensees as well as for the patent owner and 
decisions made as part of business development impact how the licensing is 
developed as a program. By creating good benchmarks by gaining evidence of 
completed deals or of favorable license prices from the patent owner’s perspective, 
the patent owner improves its ability to appropriate value with license agreements 
in the future as well. 
Throughout patent management, the specific resources called upon are the same as 
in the context of a single licensing negotiation. They simply take part in a wider 
range of activities as for instance the patent attorneys contribute to the rights related 
activities and the lawyers support here with contract related issues. 
Based on the answers to the two research questions, to appropriate value from 
licensing negotiations, the patent owning firm needs to invest in all of the three 
activity domains of rights, enforcement and licensing and in the distinct resources 
supporting these activities. The key activities, whether the patent owner is an NPE 
or a manufacturer, are those of portfolio management (including patent picking), 
litigation, detecting infringement, negotiation and strategy work. Of these, portfolio 
management (including purchase of patents) and litigation can be expected to 
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require heavy investments but they can be seen as the foundation for licensing as 
holding something others are willing to pay for can be expected to be key to any 
sales negotiation. The other activities, especially that of detecting infringement, are 
likely to require lighter investments but are part of the core work of a licensing-
focused firm. 
5.2. THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION 
As one of the contributions of this thesis, the three-stage IP value chain by Reitzig 
and Puranam (2009) could be updated from a patent licensing standpoint by 
incorporating the three patent management activity domains of Somaya (2012) into 
it. The updated value chain was depicted in chapter 2.2.3. In addition, distinct 
contributing activities to each patent management domain where identified from 
interviews and these were categorised to value creating and value appropriating 
based on their role in the patent licensing value chain. The activities and the role in 
value creation and appropriation were discussed in chapter 4.2.2. 
The findings of this thesis support the findings of Reitzig and Puranam (2009) of 
capabilities required by patent management. The capabilities highlighted by their 
work on the IP value chain, technical, legal and business, are also the capabilities 
highlighted by the framework described in this thesis and the capabilities mentioned 
and described by the interviewees. To appropriate value from its patents in licensing 
negotiations, a patent owning firm needs for instance technical and legal capability 
to navigate the technical-legal discussion around the patent right as well as business 
capability to understand the opposing side and find the best arguments to convince 
the other party of their need and of the price of the license.  
The findings also highlight the importance of patent enforcement to patent licensing. 
Based on prior work described by Somaya (2012) and on the findings from 
interviews, it is a key component to the so-called pure patent licensing in which the 
license covers only rights to use specific patents of the patent owner. As described 
in the interviews, in pure patent licensing, the threat of litigation is the only reason 
to pay for a license and the credibility of this threat determines whether to pay and, 
based on the strategic valuation model, how much to pay for the license. 
In addition, different types of “soft skills” were identified as needed to succeed in 
licensing negotiations, which are not usually highlighted by economic models. In 
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the strategic valuation model, they could be included as one of the factors affecting 
the bargaining power parameter as they are competencies of the same resources that 
affect the other factors affecting bargaining power. 
By combining game theory with resource-based thinking and using qualitative 
interviews, the thesis presents a descriptive framework that bridges the gap between 
economic literature and managerial insights and showcases how by focusing on 
value appropriation at the moment of licensing negotiations, understanding of the 
importance of earlier stages in the patent value chain from a specific strategic 
standpoint can be deepened. Although the thesis cannot be used to test theory, 
suggest that combining different perspectives and methodologies to analyse a well-
defined practical context is useful in descriptive work to come up with frameworks 
that could be tested in future research. In addition, the findings support the use of 
then chosen frameworks by being very much in line with for instance the outcomes 
predicted by the strategic valuation model. 
5.3. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Based on the theoretical and empirical analysis of licensing-focused patent 
management, patent licensing is resource-intensive and requires the consideration 
of each activity domain that are part of patent management. In addition, the inherent 
uncertainty of patents needs to be considered when conducting licensing in practice. 
What is perhaps helpful to managers is that in the early stages of the IP value chain 
(R&D and patenting), the licensing-focused leveraging strategy does not compete 
with the needs of the so-called proprietary strategy as both benefit from strong 
patents. Also, firms following a defensive patent strategy are likely to hold patents 
with exposure to the market which is similarly needed for patent licensing. As a 
practical implication, investments in the patenting and portfolio management 
following strategies aimed at commercialisation also enable shifting to a licensing 
focus afterwards. This was also the case with two of the firms interviewed which 
focused on licensing for the part of their patent portfolio that they no longer 
implemented themselves. 
Based on the findings of this thesis, litigation is a requirement for a sustainable 
leveraging strategy. A patent owner is unlikely to get licensees if potential licensees 
realise it is not able to enforce its rights in court. On the other hand, litigation can 
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be regarded as a demand generating activity which strengthens both the patent 
owner’s bargaining power as well as the strength of its assets for future licensing 
negotiations. As firms cannot sue everyone, the essential strategic question is what 
type of a reference is the firm looking for. Based on the interviews, the biggest legal 
battles won are likely to be the strongest references for future negotiations but they 
can also be the ones to sink the patent owner’s business. To gain references but stay 
afloat, firms should try to choose their battles wisely. 
To mitigate patent related uncertainty, licensing firms usually include several 
patents or bundles of patents in licensing negotiations instead of just individual ones. 
As an example, in the interviews, the interviewees discussed choosing the patents 
for the negotiation in plural. The need to mitigate uncertainty also affects the earlier 
stages of the IP value chain as firms can protect their inventions with multiple 
property rights (e.g. by patenting several features or combining different types of 
intellectual property rights for protection).  
Although licensing-focused patent management requires investments to different 
activities, patent owners conducting licensing don’t need to take part in all the 
activities that are part of patent management or the IP value chain. Based on the 
interviews, outsourcing of patent management activities is common and in the case 
of SMEs, nearly all activities apart from strategic decision-making can be 
outsourced. Based on the focus in literature on NPEs and on the interviews, a 
licensing-focused strategy does also not require the firm to conduct R&D: the 
patented inventions may be developed by the patent owner or the ownership of the 
patent may have transferred after the invention has been made. 
Based on the interviews, pure patent licensing in practice is not the norm but the 
exception for many of the firms conducting licensing. However, by understanding 
the difficulties of pure patent licensing, firms can apply its logic to circumvent some 
of these difficulties. For instance, if the firm doesn’t have the resources to litigate, 
it can try to bundle the patents to an agreement including also other things such as 
sales of patents or technology. In the same vein, a small technology firm willing to 
leverage their inventions through licensing could attempt partnering up with a larger 
market player that could help the smaller firm enforce its rights and that way 
generate demand to its licenses. 
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5.4. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The theoretical framework which the analysis of the thesis is built on is based on 
several assumptions which need to be considered when interpreting the results and 
using it to analyse licensing-focused patent management and value appropriation in 
practice. The main limitations of using the framework and suggestions for future 
research are discussed next. As a general area of interest in future research would 
be testing the findings of this thesis with practical cases as currently the findings are 
only descriptive. 
The first limitation of the framework is that it is based on assumptions concerning 
pure patent licensing and the way it is discussed in this thesis, one-sided patent 
licensing, where one firm acts as a licensor and another as a potential licensee. As 
it attaches the price of the license strictly to factors impacting the threat of litigation, 
it doesn’t depict license deals that include also other sales items such as technology 
products, know-how or patents, which is often how patents get licensed in practice. 
However, by focusing on pure patent licensing, the framework does give insight into 
why this may be the case in practice as it highlights the many requirements of patent 
licensing. The current framework is also not built for analysing cross-licensing. 
However, by developing the strategic valuation model further, the strength of the 
patents and the exposure these patents have to the business on each side could be 
depicted by the factors in the model in the future which could broaden the use of the 
framework.  
A limitation of the strategic valuation model the theoretical framework is built on is 
that it describes the licensing negotiation of an individual patent. In reality, and for 
reasons highlighted by the model, patents are often licensed in bundles. Although 
the model highlights the reason why this is done and is sufficient for describing the 
relevant factors impacting value appropriation in licensing, it should be developed 
further as a model to portray the licensing of multiple patents to be useful for 
analysing actual completed license deals usually involving several patents.  
The strategic valuation model assumes that the negotiating parties are rational, 
which may not always be the case in practice. As some of the interviews mentioned, 
rivalry in the product market can for instance spill over to licensing discussions by 
making them more difficult then perhaps they would be if the parties wouldn’t have 
issues due to their tough rivalry. However, rationality could be expected to generally 
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apply to long negotiations in which both sides call upon experienced negotiators 
and, in that sense, be a sensible assumption for the descriptive analysis in this thesis. 
In addition, by focusing on the negotiation as the point at which value is 
appropriated, the analysis also implies a level of trustworthiness of the licensees 
which can be a strong assumption considering that some of the experts interviewed 
specifically mentioned the need for compliance and contract management after 
reaching agreements to make sure what was agreed upon actually comes true. 
Research on these activities would be probably complementary to the findings in 
this thesis and would help draw a wider picture of the factors impacting value 
appropriation in patent licensing in practice. 
Lastly, the rational for litigation in the framework and in this thesis is based on and 
limited to countries and jurisdictions where rule of law apply. In legal systems 
impacted by politics and which favor national players, operating as a foreign 
licensor is likely to be affected also by factors outside the scope of this thesis and 
these factors should be taken into consideration when conducting licensing across 
the globe. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS  
The purpose of this thesis was to offer managerial insights into factors that are 
important to consider when developing patent management with a strategy focused 
on licensing. The research problem was: What activities and resources should a 
patent owning firm invest in to appropriate value from its patents in licensing 
negotiations? By analysing this question, the thesis shed light on key issues 
managers should factor into their decision-making when deciding which activities 
and resources they should channel their limited resources to if attempting to leverage 
their patents through licensing. 
The theoretical analysis for this study was done by dividing the patent management 
capability into its activities and supporting resources and capabilities as well as by 
presenting a game-theoretic model depicting the value appropriation context that 
served as the basis for answering the research problem of the thesis. Based on earlier 
research, three key activity domains of rights, enforcement and licensing were 
identified. Also, several resources in addition to patents where identified.  
The strategic valuation model emphasised four factors impacting value 
appropriation in patent licensing negotiations: case strength, bargaining power, cost 
of litigation and the discounted value from the asset in which a patent is 
implemented. The four factors were analysed based on 13 expert interviews with 
managers and consultants representing different patent management units and 
activities. Based on the interviews, activities and resources contributing to value 
appropriation in the context of an individual licensing negotiation and throughout 
patent management were identified and linked to the three activity domains of patent 
management. 
Based on the findings of this thesis, value appropriation in licensing-focused patent 
management depends on the resource position and the relative capabilities of the 
patent owning firm compared to its potential licensees. For the patent management 
to be on sustainable foothold, the firm should invest in choosing its patents and 
opponents in licensing negotiations and in all the three activity domains that form 
patent management as part of the patent value chain. For firms conducting pure 
patent licensing and not tying patent licenses to other deals, investing in patent 
enforcement is especially important as the price of the license is directly dependent 
on the credibility of the threat of litigation.  
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APPENDIXES 
Appendix 1: Interview guide for managers. 
 
Section Main question Follow-up questions
Background information: role of 
patents, patent use, strategic 
importance of patents, defining 
entitity (NPE / PE)
Describe the role of patents for your company's 
business. 
Approximately, how many patents / patent families 
does your company own? 
Are the patented technologies developed by your 
company or have they been acquired?
Are the patented technologies used in your company's 
products or processes?
Are the patents a source of income for your company? 
Are they licensed? 
Do the patents have other use-cases that are important 
for your company?
For your company's business, how important are 
patents? 
How about compared to other intellectual property 
rights?
Background information: 
experience with assertion, 
importance of assertion based 
thinking in company context
How many patent cases does your company deal with 
yearly? 
In these cases, how often are you the targeting party vs 
the targeted party? 
What is the risk of your company being targeted by 
other companies?
How many are negotiated?
How many are litigated?
Background information: context 
impacting patent use
Are there any commitments or other external factors 
that impact the way your company can use its patents? 
Are your patents for instance part of standards? 
Do you need to consider the FRAND principle when 
determining royalties?
Resources: size of unit / team, mix 
of experts
Company specific wording: How many people work in 
the patent business unit / in your team / with patent 
related matters in your company?
How many of them work full-time vs part-time with 
patent related matters?
What types of academic backgrounds or professions are 
represented?
Resources: specialization, level of 
expertise within organization
How specialized are their roles? Do you have different people for administrative, judicial 
and business development activities? 
Do different peope focus on different technologies? 
Resources: bargaining power, 
importance of model
Does your company have a budget for patent 
assertion?
Resources: use of internal 
capabilities outside patenting
Company specific wording: What type of collaboration 
is there between your patent unit/team and other 
units/teams inside the company?
With which unit / team? 
How often / closely?
Resources: external capabilities, 
extent of outsourcing, type of 
capabilities (administrative / judicial 
/ business)
What types of patent related services do you buy from 
other companies i) in your daily business ii) in assertion 
cases?
Parameters: context, typical case Describe a typical patent case your company deals 
with.
Who claims infringement?
What type of company is on the other side (NPE / PE, 
size, portfolio size, competitor, industry, IP strength)?
How large of a portfolio do you have compared to the 
other side?
How is the case solved?
EXTRA: Has the typical case changed over the years?
Parameters, case strength: 
detection of infringement, 
technological / market context, 
actions / capabilities
If your company's patented technology is used without 
permission by another company, how is this 
infringement detected?
Is infringement easy to detect (when your company's 
patent are concerned)?
Do you look for these cases actively? Could you 
describe the process for detecting infringement?
Parameters, case strength: proving 
infringement, capabilities for 
proving infringement
In a typical case, how difficult is it to prove in court 
that an infringement has occurred?
If difficult? 
What sort of expertise is needed for this?
Does your company have internal experts for this?
Do you use external resources for this?
Parameters, case strength: patent 
strength, impacting factors
Can you describe some of the characters that are 
important for patent validity?
What makes a patent weak?
Parameters, case strength: patent 
strength, impacting capabilities
How can you increase your chances of holding a valid 
patent?
Parameters, case strength: other 
factors
What other factors (in addition to being able to prove 
the infringement and having a valid patent) impact the 
likelihood to "win" the case or get a favourable result?
Parameters, profit; price of 
license: determining royalties
In a typical case, how are royalties determined? What determines what the "cake" is and how it is 
"sliced"?
Parameters, profit; price of 
license: impacting model, resources
Can you impact [how the royalties are determined]? How?
Do you use internal or external experts the who focus 
on issues related to this?
What do they work on?
Parameters, bargaining power: 
impacting factors
In a typical case, what determines how long your 
company can continue with a negotiation?
Parameters, bargaining power: link 
between units of business, 
potential examples
Company specific wording: In a typical case, how much 
do you have to consider the impact the negotiation 
may have on other units of business / the rest of your 
company's business / your company's primary 
business?
Can you give an example?
Parameters, case strength: link 
between case strength and 
negotiation
Does the strength of your case (which was discussed 
earlier) affect your company's eagerness to continue 
the negotiation?
